

Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-060
Wednesday
27 March 1996

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Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-060 *27 March 1996*

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Albania: FRG Defense Minister Arrives for 2-Day Visit

AU2703102596 Tirana ATA in English 2023 GMT 26 Mar 96

[Report by A. Cama, F. Nikolla]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, March 26 (ATA)—Defence Minister of FR of Germany Volker Ruehe arrived in Albania this afternoon for a two day formal visit.

He comes at the invitation of the Albanian Defence Minister Safet Zhulali, in the context of the further development of relations and all round cooperation, also including the military one, between Albania and Germany.

Ruehe is visiting Albania for the first time. His visit follows that of Minister Zhulali in Germany last November during which a joint statement was signed. The statement assures the Albanian Armed Forces of the German support for their reconstruction.

Ruehe follows with competence the opening of Western security institutions towards the East and also introduces the Scandinavian space into the European integration.

Ruehe had declared in Bon before he came to Albania that "his visit aims at expanding and strengthening good and friendly relations between the two countries."

The first German-Albanian exercise "Mat-96" is planned to start this fall. The German military aid to Albania has been materialised not so much in figures than in experience.

Important during Ruehe's visit will be the meeting at the Military Academy "Skenderbej" and the handing over of a German aid. He will also participate in the inauguration of the Strategic Studies Center in Albania.

Ruehe will discuss with President Berisha, Premier Meksi, and Defence Minister Zhulali the extension of bilateral military relations also in the context of the general development in the Balkans and the development of a security architecture for Europe.

Germany has promised Albania support especially in the solution to the Kosova problem. This visit is made only few days before the meeting of the Balkan defence ministers with the U.S. Defence Minister William Perry in Tirana.

Present to receive Ruehe at Rinas airport were the Albanian counterpart, Safet Zhulali; the chief of the General Staff, Sheme Kosova; the deputy minister of Defence, Luan Lazimi; the deputy minister for the Defence Policy, Alfred Moisiu, and other senior militaries.

The two countries' ambassadors, Saganjori and Disdorn, as well as the military attaches were also present. (endall) 262023 dj/calpin

Albania: Interior Ministry Delegation Departs for China

AU2703090796 Tirana ATA in English 1604 GMT 26 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, March 26 (ATA)—A delegation of the Interior Ministry, headed by minister Agron Musaraj, left today for a formal visit to Beijing, at the invitation of the Chinese Minister of Public Security, Tao Siju.

The cooperation between the two country's police, giving priority to the fight against drug traffic, money laundering and illegal emigration will be institutionalised through the bilateral cooperative agreement, to be signed by the two ministers during the visit.

Albania: International Institutes Invited To Observe Elections

AU2703090396 Tirana ATA in English 1901 GMT 26 Mar 96

[Report by R. Floqi]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, March 26 (ATA)—Albanian Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi met in Tirana today with representatives of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, of the U.S. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, of the International Foundation on Electoral Systems and others, Premier's Office reports.

They concentrated on the coming elections in Albania. Meksi showed the Albanian Government's serious efforts to guarantee free elections, in full conformity with the law.

Meksi expressed the conviction that the elections will be free and fair stressing that the pre-electoral clamour on manipulations is groundless and is made by the Socialist Party and its allies to justify their inevitable failure in the next elections.

The representatives of international institutions welcomed the invitation of Premier Meksi to observe the elections and guaranteed the presence of representatives of the most outstanding institutions in this direction.

They also discussed possibilities of technical qualification of the Central Commission and other electoral commissions to be created.

Albania: Berisha Leads 'Double Life' as Party Chairman

AU2503151096 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 15 Mar 96 p 4

[Commentary by Gavrosh Levonja: "Albania, State Without a Head of State"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Even if it is unofficial, the country is now launched into an electoral campaign that shows every sign of becoming increasingly heated, that does not exclude possibly dangerous developments and a move toward violence, and that will only destroy and build nothing. When we talk about violence, we obviously mean the violence that uses not weapons but words, and whose pressure is no less effective than that of violence in other forms.

There is not a shadow of doubt that there will be such clashes in the forthcoming campaign. Legislation, which guarantees the normal functioning of all areas of daily life, provides certain rules for them. However, this electoral contest requires an institution or individual to supervise it and to oblige the participatory sides to play according to certain defined rules and to appeal for the calm that will allow the race to proceed in a civilized fashion, not in the Anatolian-Byzantine ways we have inherited from the East, and into which we have willy-nilly been incorporated throughout our history. Somebody needs to utter the words "love, harmony, peace," which are highly valuable words in this poisoned and strenuous period of political transition, in which opponents attack one another with the most revolting vulgarity.

Scalfaro in Italy does such a thing very well, as does Herzog in Germany and other presidents in parliamentary democracies. Presidents in presidential republics, although members of parties, do not take part in legislative elections, and least of all in election campaigns. On the basis of the constitutional provisions that are still in power, it is up to the president, the head of state, to play the role of referee and pacifier of the inflamed and militant temperaments. Unfortunately, our presidential referee not only behaves like a sick soccer fan but, worse, is not able for a moment to shed the blue uniform of his team and is even his team's captain and top scorer, thanks to his exploitation of his responsibilities as referee.

One therefore inevitably asks: "Do we have a president?" "Have we had one since 22 March 1992?" Everyone remembers the April day in 1992 when Professor Dr. Sali Berisha, the first non- (if ex-) communist president, officially resigned from the post of chairman of the winning party in the elections. According to the constitutional dispositions, he also resigned his mandate as deputy, precisely in order to conform to the role allotted to him by the law. He took his oath before the parliament to become the president of all Albanians.

However, it became evident as time passed that his departure from the party chairmanship was merely a formality. He regularly took part in Democratic Party [PD] meetings, even in its presidium, and delivered speeches on its manifesto. His total and indisputable influence on decisionmaking in leading party forums, which turned the party's formal leaders, his official successors, into puppets, showed that he and nobody else was the real party leader. How naive seemed the views of those who claimed at the time when Selami was unseated that "the two big parties are without chairmen." The man elected by the votes of deputies to be head of state was at the same time seen to be the prime minister, turning the formal occupant of that post into a modern Haxhi Lleshi, who, instead of signing certificates and awards, put his signature on bills and decrees that reached him under instructions from the president or the party. The events of recent years have shown that the man who is said to be head of the Albanian state is also foreign minister, interior minister, and chairman of the National Intelligence Service, the Constitutional Court, and the Court of Cassation. However, the post of president is not compatible with any other post, and this is why the man elected as president must stand back from his party.

This double life, if the light of such recent events as Berisha's assumption of the leadership of the electoral campaign from the presidential throne, his attacks on other parties, and his support for his own party alone, show that Professor Dr. Sali Berisha is chairman of the PD.

The final seal was set on this by his attendance at the Paris conference, to which he went in his capacity as PD chairman. "We welcome in particular Prof. Dr. Sali Berisha, leader of the PD of Albania," said Mr. Alois Mock in his greeting to the conference of European conservative parties. It would perhaps have been more appropriate if Berisha had followed the advice of his friend, who suggested after 22 March [1992] that it would be better for him to remain party chairman and not cast his eyes toward the post of president.

Albania: Commentary Examines Berisha's 'Megalomaniacal Dream'

AU2503180296 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 15 Mar 96 p 3

[Commentary by Mehmet S. Lirza: "Berisha Works for Berisha"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A single constant is evident in all the statements, comments, decisions, and even laws approved by parliament, in every action, campaign, and even every standpoint and gesture of the present government: They have a single originator, organizer, and executor in the shape of Sali Berisha, Albania's number-one. The state, the government, the parliament, the administration, the courts, the state mass media, and even the Democratic Party [PD] have all been put to work in the service of the charismatic leader, "the indomitable and legendary" Sali Berisha.

One has the impression that there is no more democracy in Albania but that the country has undergone the most astonishing metamorphosis into a media organization within a relatively short time, within the mandate of a single government. Of course, under other circumstances, if political pluralism had not been institutionalized and we did not have an organized opposition, Berisha would have had every chance of becoming the Hoxha the Second of our minuscule country, becoming an even more famous and "glorious" dictator than Enver. That is why Sali Berisha has not become a dictator, and not because of any kindness or democratic spirit on the part of our surgeon [reference to Berisha's former profession]. Many political analysts consider him the spawn of the dictatorship and the final example of postcommunist stolidity. This is why the public watches his antics less with anxiety or the bitter smile of indifference than with terror lest he establish a dictatorship modeled on his "democratic demagoguery."

Understanding this paradox, Sali Berisha and especially the PD have been gripped by general fear and confusion as they face a new vote of public confidence and do not know what to do or say. The situation might be illustrated by the popular saying, "going around and around like the horse on the threshing floor." Berisha has for a long time been hurling himself against his office walls and openly showing signs of political annoyance and imbalance. He wanders all over Albania and the world and can find rest nowhere. He strives to appear as if he had assumed the mantle of Zeus, as if the task of president were not enough for him, but that he must also be prime minister, foreign minister, the cabinet, a Supreme Court judge, PD chairman, party delegate, and so forth.

He has recently even launched an initiative to renovate the opposition, laying down its manifesto and the political figures who should take charge of it. He has been performing this duty recently even outside Albania, as if our country, the economy, and the national question were not worries enough.

This entire image is merely a cover for Berisha's real anxiety, which took root in him after the failure of his referendum on the constitution. The loss of the campaign for the referendum put an end to his megalomaniacal dream of becoming "king" of the Albanians and satisfying his limitless appetite for power. It was also a prelude and a sure litmus test for his fatal defeat in the coming elections.

At the same time, the failure of this entirely personal campaign of his showed the other PD leaders that "with Berisha we are lost." The best illustration of this situation in the PD and of Berisha's intentions was the Selami phenomenon, apparently so unexpected. Sali Berisha therefore planned his future survival in two directions. The PD was chosen as the first way, and the road was to be made clear to restore Berisha to the party leadership. To this end, Selami and his followers in the districts were dismissed. The second direction, intended also to distract public attention from the split in the PD, lay in an unprincipled tooth-and-nail struggle against the opposition and its personalities, with the ultimate intention of splitting the opposition into fractions.

The public has witnessed how Berisha has pursued this strategy for survival. If he failed in his second strategy, thanks to the resistance and political maturity of the opposition and thanks to the experience they had acquired from the president himself in the "Nano case," Berisha achieved total success in his first strategy, although there are signs that the "Selami phenomenon" will prove to be a delayed-action time bomb in the ranks of the PD, precisely when the time comes to assign responsibility for its loss of power.

Even though Berisha is working overtime and also is violating his position as president of all Albanians and breaching the constitutional provisions in order to earn the post of PD chairman, this has in fact caused irritation in the party, which is full of squabbling clans.

A figure in the PD originating from the old emigre parties has been quoted as saying: "Berisha reminds the Albanians of Enver." He is creating a mass allergy to the PD. Berisha does not work either for the PD or, as some say, for the Socialist Party. He works for himself. It is evident that Berisha is trifling with his party's reputation. The purging of personalities within the PD is not a new phenomenon. It began with the 'motionists' [Neritan Ceka, Gramoz Pashko, and other founders of

the Democratic Alliance], and continued with Kalakulla and Baleta, and later with Selami. It seems that it is now the turn of "a new hostile group." Berisha wants a weak PD with the aim of dominating it more easily, with the intention of keeping it as a shield for tomorrow and as a job for when he is in opposition. This is the context for his statement that, if he loses the election he "will resign as president," if this is not merely a demagogic statement for foreign consumption and a sign that he has the strength to respect the popular verdict of the ballot box.

In any case, the post of PD chairman will be free for Berisha, who looks over not the interests of his party, but those of Sali.

Albania: Town Decorates Imprisoned Socialist Leader Nano

AU2503180896 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 19 Mar 96 p 9

[Report by Arian Cani: "Is Tepelene Municipality's Decoration of Fatos Nano Legal?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—"Nano's decoration? This was merely a moral act, neither legal nor illegal." Albanian lawyers and experts commented thus on the decision of the municipality of Tepelene a few days ago to award the imprisoned Socialist Party [PS] leader the title of "honorary citizen." Whether legal or not, the decision of the Municipal Council of this southern town appears to have prompted new controversy among the Albanian public. Senior state officials say that there is no special law on decorations and explain that this matter falls within the responsibilities of local government authorities, What has Fatos Nano done for Tepelene, and what is the motivation behind the town's granting of this title?

Njazi Kosovrasti, minister for local government, did not hesitate to talk about the decoration of the imprisoned Socialist leader: "The Tepelene Municipal Council is obliged to submit the decision to the prefect within 10 days, and, if the latter holds that the decision is not valid, the council may turn to the courts." Kosovrasti prefers not to prejudge the award and says: "I do not know the criteria according to which the Municipality of Tepelene has awarded this decoration, but I can say that the main criterion for the award of such a title must be the links between the recipient and the town, and the work he has done for it." Kosovrasti explains that he can nevertheless not talk about the case of Fatos Nano, because, as he put it, "I am not aware of the reasons behind this act of the Tepelene municipality." He implied that acts of this kind are merely administrative matters, and, if there are contradictory views or decisions, they can be resolved by the Municipal Council, the Prefecture, and the courts.

But what is Fatos Nano's connection with Tepelene, and what has he done for the town? It is well known that four years ago the PS leader chose Kucove as the constituency where he would stand as a deputy. At that time, Tepelene was for Nano a town like any other, even one on the fringes of his electoral ambitions. The Democratic Party then won the votes of the people of Tepelene. No, what most closely links the imprisoned Socialist chairman to th the town is simply his physical presence. He has become a mythical being who, for three years, has been unable to see anything out of the arrow-slits of Bence prison except the walls of Ali Pasha's magnificent castle.

Ali Pasha is another personality about whom the hospitable people of this little town have begun to think again. A monument to him will soon be erected in the main square, and an encyclopedia about Ali Pasha will be published, both to honor once again this Albanian leader and friend of Napoleon.

Albania: PS Congress Approves Candidates for Deputies

AU2603121996 Tirana ATA in English 0953 GMT 25 Mar 96

[Report by R. Floqi]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, March 24 (ATA)—The Second Socialist Party [PS] Congress continued in the hall of Opera and Ballet Theater today with discussions on the report submitted the previous day by PS Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi.

PS Presidency member Dritero Agolli said that "despite adoption of the Law on Human Rights, its implementation in Albania has two sides, that of Helsinki for foreigners and that for Albania."

Dritero Agolli, who for many years under the communist dictatorship was chairman of the Writers' and Artists' League, has been recently accused by the Democratic Party [PD] of his role during that period.

"When we win in elections," said Agolli, "we shall raise the level of culture of democracy and political culture respecting political pluralism and considering parties as national values." He said that the message that President Berisha sent to this party "has not the values of a message from a genuine president."

The message of the president addressed to the PS congress said: "I want to assure them (PS members) that I have appreciated and always appreciate and have unshakably respected my opponents and their opposition

and that under the motto 'opponents but brothers,' I have considered vital the role of the opposition for a democratic society."

PS Deputy Chairman Luan Hajdaraga focused on the work of the local government and the alternatives for its improvement.

"If in the first pluralistic elections the people, through their vote, had to change the political and economic system, now through their vote they are not going to change the system but to bring to existence that political force of which they are convinced that represents the best alternative to govern the country," started his discussion on PS economic options Ylli Bufi, former premier in the transition government. He accused the PD of "not being ready to accept rotation through competition of alternatives," that the PD program "is not a program of alternatives but of a long term domination."

According to the PD press, socialist alternative is nothing else but an anti-PD and non-opposition alternative and it restores the former communist position.

Delegations of Socialist and Social Democratic Parties of Romania, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], Slovenia, Denmark and others greeted the congress.

The congress presented to delegates for approval its electoral platform and addressed an appeal "for the release of Fatos Nano."

After discussions, the congress also approved the 352 candidates for deputies proposed in the PS conferences of the districts for 115 election zones and 45 others for the proportional system lists. After examined by the State Commission of Verification of the Figures of Politicians and Officials, these candidates will be defined by PS Leading Committee according to the election zones when the latter will be fixed.

Bulgaria: PM's Moscow Visit Leaves Gas Transport Unresolved

AU2603212696 Sofia SEGA in Bulgarian 21-27 Mar 96 p 27

[Commentary by Ognyan Velkov: "Did Videnov Succeed in Moscow?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Under conditions of an ever growing freedom of press in Bulgaria, Videnov's visit to Moscow was described as a success.

Unfortunately, the facts do not correspond to this only correct line. It was obvious that the Russian side was cold and reserved. The Moscow press even allowed itself a few insults, including several blows below the belt, on the backside.

Obviously, the gas issue is the apple of discord. This topic became so complicated that now even the main thing is no longer clear—where will the gas pipelines pass through? The treaties from 1986 and 1989 categorically designate us as the only variant. Now it suddenly appears that Gazprom has not one but two new variants, and neither involves Bulgaria.

The first is through northern Caucasus, Georgia, and Turkey. It is a shorter route which offers another advantage: In exchange for effecting this project, Turkey could help Moscow to achieve peace in the Caucasus. It is well known that Ankara has a great part in the disturbances.

Turkey could get a terrific benefit not only in the material sphere, but also in the geopolitical area. The Americans firmly favor this variant because it places them in an active position in anything related to the carriers of energy in the Balkans.

Against this background one should not be puzzled by the fact that the new Turkish foreign minister is his country's greatest oil and gas expert. Ankara's dream is to be involved in supplying gas to Greece.

The second variant is through Hungary to Serbia, (with a possible detour to Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and various possibilities regarding Greece), and from Serbia—to northern Italy. The Hungarian Government is ready to resort to flattering Vyakhirev [Gazprom chairman], whom our government demonstratively shuns.

The main result of those two variants was the emergence of a "nationally responsible" Bulgarian prime minister and even more nationally responsible advisers to the prime minister. The summit of this nationally responsible policy was Krasimir Nikolov's statement, chief of the prime minister's office, who said on 29 February 1996: "If this is how they play ball with us, this is how we will play ball with them."

Oh boy! Does Grandfather Ivan like to play ball with people who make such statements!

Rumor has it that, during the dinner with Videnov in Moscow, Mr. Vyakhirev gave Krasimir Nikolov, the nationally responsible adviser to the prime minister, a dressing-down. Videnov kept silent and continues to keep silent. A question to him: Are Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Turkey, and so forth, banana republics just because they allow the transit passage of gas through their territory, and are they prepared to do everything to expand the operation?

What is this national interest, which has been kept secret for one year already and has been referred to only by hints? Who in our country is a recognized professional, worthy of defending our interests?

We only have a group of amateurs, who are facing Gazprom, one of the most influential companies in the world. This week, for example, Rem Vyakhirev is visiting the United States, where he will meet Clinton. His visit to Texas has been organized by Baker, and to New York by Kissinger. Recently, Sofia allowed itself to cancel one half of the events included in his official visit.

The truth about Videnov's visit to Moscow is that the distrust has not been eliminated. The memorandum that was signed indeed ensures the supply of gas and the existence of Topenergy. However, for the time being this is a minimum variant. The decision to make Bulgaria the main transit center in the Balkans has not been adopted yet, and its adoption is less and less likely.

Thus, we are likely to lose the gas transportation taxes, which could amount to $500 million per year. This is so because, as the prime minister's adviser put it, we also know how to play ball their way. It is already clear who is winning the game.

Bulgaria: Report on BSP Regular Weekly News Conference

AU2603172996 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 26 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] At its 26 March meeting, the Political Consultative Committee of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP]-the Aleksandur Stamboliyski Bulgarian Agrarian National Union [BZNS]-Ecoglasnost Political Club coalition decided to hold a joint meeting on 21 April, at which the progress of the agrarian policy in the country will be discussed and a common position on this matter adopted. This coming Sunday, 31 March,

the BSP Supreme Council and the socialist members of the National Assembly will work out their position on this matter. This was pointed out at today's BSP regular weekly news conference by Zhan Videnov and Svetoslav Shivarov.

Each of the coalition parties has its program on the agrarian policy, and therefore they will first discuss their positions separately, Mr. Shivarov said. He pointed out that there is a great similarity between the parties' programs.

Mr. Shivarov also said that there is no grain crisis in the country and that there is enough grain and flour, especially in Sofia. Zhan Videnov added that the state has fulfilled its commitments to the private bread producers and said that their threats are a desperate attempt to increase the bread price. This is a pure racket, Videnov said.

The BSP Supreme Council chairman does not think that the opposition will easily agree on a single presidential candidate. He thinks that the important thing for the Democratic Left is to participate in the presidential elections in a manner that will guarantee its success.

According to Mr. Videnov, the BSP must propose its own candidates for president and vice president. So far, however, the party has not decided on any nominations, and Mr. Videnov does not think that it already is too late.

The BSP Executive Bureau discussed the progress of the accountability-election campaign throughout the country. Nikolay Dobrev said that it is progressing with the active participation of the party members and is evoking great interest.

Czech Republic: More Post-Christopher Questions Than Answers

AU2603142196 Prague PRAVO in Czech 22 Mar 96 p 4

[Commentary by Josef Vesely: "The Time for the Answers on NATO Has Not Yet Arrived"]

[FBIS Translated Text] U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher's talks in Prague did not deliver a breakthrough, and one was not expected from them. Rather, they can be compared to a new layer of easeful compress on the chronic security malady of the countries of Central and East Europe.

There is a long way to go until the operation that would give the countries concerned hope of a more lasting resistance to an external threat. Of course, nothing can help here; not even the Friday [22 March] round of U.S.-Russian talks in Moscow.

Incidentally, Christopher's talks with Yeltsin and Primakov are not meant to be a continuation of the Prague meeting, but, according to U.S. sources, will be more of a stocktaking of past agreements and arrangements between the two powers. The fundamental message of the advocates of the alliance's enlargement toward the East—that it must take place gently, step by step, and by abiding to the conditions so that a new dividing line is not created, leading to the risky isolation of an unstable Russia—also has certain weak points. First and foremost, it arouses the as yet not completely well-founded hope that the ambitious plan is implementable. Moreover, implementable quickly and painlessly for all of the participating sides—in the style of the familiar saying about the contented wolf and the untouched goat.

The situation is not black and white, either on the part of NATO or within a disorderly Russia in the run-up to the elections, to say nothing of the zone containing a dozen states whose representatives came to Prague to meet Christopher. In view of the smoldering situation in Bosnia, "outsiders" (from the point of view of a disdainful citizen of Prague) such as Bulgaria and Albania are of greater actual and strategic significance for the United States and NATO. For the same reason, the Hungarians and Slovenes are also "interesting" to NATO's planners.

Poland has a notoriously recognized strategic priority and, along with the Czech Republic, a rather high symbolic military-political value. This, in our case, is complicated by the scattering of question marks over Slovakia. Because the alliance's possible enlargement will be considered case by case, it is hard to separate our "case" from that of Slovakia. Many NATO experts cannot imagine an imaginary border between two worlds on the Morava River, or they see in this the source of new, until now, nonexistent tension. That is, the very opposite of "radiating stability toward the East," which NATO has made the aim of its possible enlargement in this geographical direction.

Moscow is often quoted as the only dog in the manger. Representatives of the Russian Federation indeed make implacable statements, and some of them are so fiery in the run-up to the elections that they are again reopening old wounds among its weaker already scared neighbors. Even this, of course, does not absolve the chairman of the Czech parliament's Defense and Security Committee, Vladimir Suman (Civic Democratic Alliance), who spoke out, as he did at an international colloquium in Prague (at the very moment Christopher's aircraft landed at Ruzyne Airpo[illegible]n favor of the toughest possible policy by the W[illegible]rn democracies against this heretical Eastern powe[illegible], as the case may be, even with a nuclear sword in their hands. The deputy reproached in advance the Czech Republic's possible future Western allies for new "Munichéering"! If only it were all so simple!

During Christopher's lecture in the Cernin Palace, some West European journalists were asking a counter question in the lobbies: whether the U.S. guest is also speaking on behalf of their states when he gives his new Eastern friends an assurance of the best prospects for the alliance's enlargement, which could "irritate Moscow." That is, the public in many NATO countries is already beginning to have doubts about the sense of the professed step. These are bolstered by the arguments of some political scientists and military experts, who point out that no one knows exactly what kind of tasks an enlarged alliance should in fact fulfill. The views of observers are mounting that, in a situation where no one knows how the presidential elections in Russia and the United States this year will turn out, it is premature and perhaps also inappropriate to talk about revolutionary strategic changes in the euro-atlantic domain, let alone implement them practically.

The U.S. role in NATO remains, naturally, a dominant one, and Germany's natural interest in handing over to Poland the baton of a potential "front-line" state, should there be a new crisis along the former Iron Curtain, also plays its role alongside it. However, the alliance is made up of 16 sovereign states, and each of them has the right of veto in the first phase of decisionmaking on new allies. Then, the parliaments of all of the current member states, without whose ratification no, albeit the best intended, decision by the politicians or military will come into effect, have to have the final say. So, the question marks surrounding NATO enlargement have

increased rather than decreased. But the time for the answers has not yet arrived.

Czech Republic: NATO Official: Christopher Misinterpreted

AU2603143096 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 23 Mar 96 p 1

[Article by "(zah)" and CTK: "Christopher Was Apparently Misunderstood"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Brussels—A NATO official said in Brussels yesterday that U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher was misunderstood in Prague when he was talking about the admission of the former communist countries into the alliance. According to this source, Christopher was not suggesting that the decision on which countries will be admitted to NATO and when should be made at the alliance's summit in December.

"Warren Christopher was misinterpreted in Prague when it was said that he indicated this. That is not the case," said the aforementioned source. "We have not said yes to any countries. The yes applies generally. The questions of 'who' and 'when' will be considered in December. This does not mean that a decision will be made. Nevertheless, when it could be made should be determined."

The U.S. minister spoke in the Cernin Palace on Wednesday [20 March] to the 12 foreign ministers from the countries applying for membership in the alliance about December as the period when a decision will be made on the next steps to be taken. "NATO has entered into the second phase of the process. In December, we will make a decision regarding the next steps to be taken. We are resolved to continue moving forward. NATO has committed itself to accepting new members. It must—and will not—leave the new democracies in the waiting room," said the head of U.S. diplomacy.

First Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandr Vondra said on Wednesday after Christopher's speech that the United States reckons that the political decisions concerning when the alliance will be enlarged and by whom could be made at the end of the year. The NATO summit in December will be the alliance's first meeting after the presidential elections in Russia and the United States. Observers agree that the elections may influence the decision on the alliance's enlargement. This applies in particular to Russia, which is openly opposed to the alliance's enlargement.

Czech Republic: Official on Christopher Visit, Russian Policy

AU2603153896 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 23 March 96 p 3

[Interview with Jiri Payne, chairman of the Czech Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee, by Bohumil Pecinka; place and date not given: "U.S. Shuttle Diplomacy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Pecinka] What do you expect from the results of Warren Christopher's talks in Europe?

[Payne] The talks have the attributes of typical U.S. shuttle diplomacy, when the United States holds talks with all of the countries involved and plays a kind of mediating role. It has to be of interest to us that the Partnership for Peace initiative is entering into a new phase, the phase in which the individual talks on full membership in NATO are beginning to be held. When we read through our individual document on the Partnership with an official from the North Atlantic alliance, we came to the end and he said: But, I tell you, that would already be full membership. I hope the U.S. secretary of state will support these efforts.

[Pecinka] What do you say to the proposal from Russian Foreign Minister Primakov that the countries of Central Europe join only NATO's political structures and not its military ones?

[Payne] I think Russian diplomacy has entered into another phase with this initiative. The first was associated with Minister Kozyrev, who tried to postpone as much as possible any kind of serious debate on NATO enlargement. He managed this only until September of last year, however, when NATO approved for the first time an official document that discourses on the possibility of enlargement. Primakov has already gone into a completely different area of negotiation.

[Pecinka] What do you think of the State Duma's resolution on renewing the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics?

[Payne] This bears witness to certain traditional ambitions and to the attempts to reintegrate the former countries of the Soviet Union. Whether Russia merely talks about these issues or whether we are to understand that it is capable of using its army will be, I think, decisive. There is yet another factor in the game. Russia has been admitted into the Council of Europe, which I view as a shift on the international scene, as giving up on certain human rights principles that had been respected until now. This compromise may also be projected into international relations.

Czech Republic: SD-LSNS Expresses Confidence in Bodenlos

AU2603200196 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 23 Mar 96 p 2

[Report by "(kac)": "Bodenlos Is Still Chairman"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The leadership of the Free Democrats-Liberal National Social Party [SD-LSNS] yesterday expressed confidence in Vavrinec Bodenlos, who is one of its chairmen. The leadership had discussed confidence in Bodenlos on account of an incident on New Year's Eve in 1991, when he threatened his neighbor with a hatchet and was given a conditional sentence of three months imprisonment.

Fifty-three members of the SD-LSNS Central Council expressed their confidence in Bodenlos in a secret ballot; 13 were opposed and four ballots were invalid. The party's Central Bohemian organization expressed its support for Bodenlos on Wednesday [20 March]. At his request, it then moved him from first to third place on its list of candidates for the elections to the Chamber of Deputies. Bodenlos has himself described this position as virtually unelectable.

Slovakia: Resolution on Treaty With Hungary Passed

LD2603204596 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1830 GMT 26 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] A few moments ago today's deliberations in Slovak parliament ended. Here is our correspondent Milan Sedlacek in parliament with a live report on today's agenda:

[Sedlacek] Good evening from the parliament building. The chamber is now empty because some 30 minutes ago today's meeting of the 14th session came to an end. There is no doubt that today the Slovak Republic made one of the most important steps in its integration efforts into European and transatlantic structures.

Here in my hand is a proposal for passing the ratification of the Treaty on Good-Neighborly Relations and Friendly Cooperation between the Slovak Republic and the Hungarian Republic. Today it was passed by the deputies of the Slovak National Council [parliament]. [passage omitted]

After that the deputies began to debate the so-called basic Hungarian-Slovak Treaty. The first speaker in the debate was deputy Dusan Slobodnik, chairman of the National Council's Foreign Affairs Committee. He was asked by parliament at the 12th session of the National Council, when the debate of this point of the agenda began, to draft an explanatory resolution [Slovak: vykladove usnesenie] to the treaty. The deputies of the National Council have approved this resolution today. There were two resolutions. I will read to you the most important parts:

A. The National Council of the Slovak Republic voices agreement under Section 86e of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic with the Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the Slovak Republic and the Hungarian Republic before its ratification [as heard; Slovak: pred jej ratifikaciou].

B. It declares that it fully identifies itself with the content of the verbal note of the Slovak Foreign Ministry of 19 March 1995 delivered to the Hungarian side through diplomatic channels. It confirms that the Slovak Republic has never approved or embodied in the treaty any formulations that would recognize the principle of collective rights for minorities and rights that would allow the creation of any autonomous structures or any special status based on ethnic principles.

C. The National Council asks the Slovak Government and all bodies of the Slovak Republic, in line with the Slovak Constitution and in full awareness of the legal responsibility for the consequences ensuing from its violation, to ensure the interpretation and enforcement of the relevant stipulations of the Treaty under point B of this resolution exclusively in the spirit of individual human and civic rights.

In all, 119 deputies of the Slovak National Council voted in favor of this resolution. They have also approved the second resolution proposed by deputy Dusan Slobodnik, which states, among other things:

The Treaty creates prerequisites for the development of Slovak-Hungarian relations in all areas of common interests and represents an important contribution to the fulfillment of their strategic goal: integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic economic and security structures also through strengthening the stability in the central European region.

The resolution also says that the Slovak Republic fully respects and adheres to generally recognized standards and norms in the sphere of rights and duties of persons that belong to ethnic minorities which are based on individual civic rights as an inseparable part of general human rights. In this spirit, also the stipulations of the Basic Treaty between the Slovak Republic and the Hungarian Republic are based on the concept of individual human rights of persons that belong to ethnic minorities since any other approach could inevitably lead to the violation of human and civic rights of other citizens of the Slovak Republic.

As I mentioned before, the National Council has approved this resolution as well.

Slovakia: Text of Draft Declaration on Hungarian Treaty

AU2703115596 Bratislava Draft Resolution of the National Council of the Slovak Republic in Slovak 26 Mar 19 96

["Draft Resolution of the National Council of the Slovak Republic," dated 26 March 1996: "Declaration of the National Council of the Slovak Republic on the Treaty on Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the Slovak Republic and the Hungarian Republic of 19 March 1995"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] considers the signing of the Treaty on Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the Slovak Republic and the Hungarian Republic of 19 March 1995 to be an important act of historical reconciliation between our countries and peoples. The treaty establishes prerequisites for the development of Slovak-Hungarian relations in all areas of common interest and represents an important contribution to the implementation of their strategic goal—integration into European and Euro-Atlantic economic and security

structures—also by means of reinforcing stability in the central European region.

The NRSR states that the Treaty lays down the inviolability and unchangeability of common state borders and rules out the putting forward of any territorial claims against one another, also in the future. At the same time, the Treaty defines the legal scope—in conformity with the internal state legal system and adopted international commitments—for exercising the rights of persons belonging to ethnic minorities in the spheres of language, culture, and religion, with emphasis on loyalty toward the state, of which they are citizens.

The NRSR is convinced that the signing and the ratification of the Treaty demonstrate the readiness of both states mutually to collaborate in implementing their international legal and political commitments. The support of both countries' efforts to conclude the Treaty, particularly by EU member states, the United States, and representatives of other countries, in the process of its preparation was encouraging and confirmed the interest in Slovak-Hungarian relations developing while fully respecting the generally recognized principles and norms of international law.

The Slovak Republic fully respects, and abides by, the generally accepted standards and norms in the sphere of rights and duties of persons belonging to ethnic minorities, standards and norms that are based on individual civic rights as an integral component of universal human rights. In this spirit, also the provisions of the Basic Treaty between the Slovak Republic and the Hungarian Republic are based on the concept of individual human rights of persons belonging to minorities because any other approach could inevitably lead to the violation of the human and civic rights of other citizens of the state.

Based on its own experience from the recent past and in the interest of reinforcing stability in Europe, the Slovak Republic—like the entire international community—rejects in principle the concept of collective minority rights and any attempts to establish autonomous structures or special statuses based on an ethnic foundation, which are in direct contradiction to the Basic Treaty. Historical experience instructs us sufficiently that efforts to enforce collective rights have led to conflicts with severe consequences and remain a potential source of destabilization in Europe.

The Slovak Republic regards as exceptionally important respect for those provisions of the Treaty, in which both contracting parties undertake not to engage in, and not to support, activities that would be in contradiction with the basic principles of international law and, above all, with the sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and political independence of the Slovak Republic and the Hungarian Republic. Likewise, it appreciates both parties' consensus, embedded in Article 15, paragraph 3 of the Treaty, that persons belonging to ethnic minorities are subject to the same rights and duties arising from their citizenship as other citizens of the state in question. Conditions are thus being established for the fully fledged and equal activities of citizens belonging to ethnic minorities within the framework of the state of their appurtenance, including their obligation to respect the Constitution and other legal provisions of this state.

The Slovak Republic expects the Hungarian Republic to take the appropriate steps to halt the process of assimilation of the Slovak minority in the Hungarian Republic and toward its revitalization in the spirit of the Treaty and the relevant international documents pertaining to this sphere. The Slovak Republic fulfills, and will continue to fulfill, all its commitments under international law in the sphere of defining the legal status of persons belonging to ethnic minorities and voices its confidence that its contracting partner will proceed likewise.

The NRSR reaffirms that the Slovak Republic and all its citizens take an exceptional interest in the development of goodneighborly relations and friendly cooperation with the Hungarian Republic and voices its confidence that the consistent implementation of the Treaty's contents establishes for this all essential prerequisites and will contribute to reinforcing stability and cooperation in the central European region.

The NRSR asks the Government of the Slovak Republic formally to acquaint the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the member states of these organizations with this Declaration.

Slovakia: Committee Head on Basic Treaty With Hungary

LD2703115996 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 0600 GMT 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Deputies last night ratified the Slovak-Hungarian Basic Treaty by 119 votes in favor, one vote against, and 19 abstentions. Shortly after the vote, editors Lydia Mrazova and Michal Tvarozek asked Dusan Slobodnik, chairman of the National Council's Foreign Committee, for an interview.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent] Chairman, in terms of international politics—how important is the adoption of the resolution accompanying the ratification of the treaty?

[Slobodnik] I think it is a very important document because it demonstrates that Slovakia has always intended to ratify the treaty. This intention has been confirmed now even though we had to wait a little while for it. The reason for having to wait was that some not very appropriate (?voices) were heard from the Hungarian side time to time—and I am trying to put it very mildly. But here it is. As you have recalled, 119 deputies voted in favor and this alone testifies to the fact that this treaty was needed. You may recall perhaps that only 104 deputies were in favor when the vote on state language took place. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] You said the document was very important for Slovak-Hungarian relations. How important will the ratification of the treaty be for the future?

[Slobodnik] First and foremost, I think once international reality has been taken into account—and this applies mainly to the Hungarian side—good relations will be continued. It will be very important also for international institutions. After all, our two countries are striving for membership in European and transatlantic economic, political, and military structures. This will reaffirm that we are able to deal with our problems.

[Correspondent] This is emphasized also in another document approved by National Council deputies, which is in effect a National Council's statement on the treaty that has been approved by deputies beforehand.

[Slobodnik] As for the second resolution or statement, we intend to send it to all states and all international institutions we are a member of or for whose membership we strive—such as the European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, NATO, the Council of Europe, the Central European Initiative, and other institutions—to make them aware that we have adopted this resolution and that we observe—and we think this is very important—valid international treaties. This means we accept only individual rights on a very high level.

A report of the so-called Venice Commission, saying clearly that there is no international document which would approve collective rights, is a particular evidence of the correctness of our action. [passage omitted]

You can see that this is an international norm and that we abide by it. We intend, I repeat, to guarantee all individual rights of ethnic minorities members. [several words indistinct]

We refuse to act as a guinea pig and adopt standards for collective rights or autonomy which are practically not used in Europe. [end recording]

Slovakia: Amendment to Hungarian Treaty Not Published

AU2603201496 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 22 Mar 96 p 1

[Article by Zita Sujova: "Slobodnik Blocked Publication of Amendment to Treaty"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following an agreement with parliament Chairman Ivan Gasparovic, and with Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk participating, Dusan Slobodnik, chairman of the Foreign Committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, refused yesterday to release to the deputies in the committee the draft of an amendment to the Slovak-Hungarian Treaty stating that they will receive it on the morning of 26 March, i.e., on the day of the ratification of the treaty. Thereby he allegedly wants to prevent publication of the text in newspapers prior to its adoption. He did not explain why. Christian Democratic Movement Deputy Peter Lauko described this approach in an interview for NARODNA OBRODA as disgraceful. "We are not gossips," he said. He would not rule out that the true reason may be the government coalition's fear of the reaction by their own nationalist-oriented deputies. He pointed out that originally the text was to be ready in January, and the last time around, Slobodnik promised it by 18 March.

Slovakia: Hungarian Leaders on Treaty Ratification

LD2703121196 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0600 GMT 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] This is what the Hungarian politicians of Pozsony [Bratislava] think about the ratification of the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty:

According to Miklos Duray, chairman of Coexistence, the basic treaty cannot be enforced in Slovakia because of the supplementary resolutions, but the treaty itself will be unquestionable from international legal aspects.

Bela Bugar, chairman of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, said that what the two countries' prime ministers signed in Paris at the time is not the same basic treaty as the one which has just been ratified.

Laszlo A. Nagy, chairman of the Hungarian Civic Party, also called attention to the fact that the implementation of the basic treaty will be hindered by other laws as well, such as the language law, the reform of the regional administration, and an amendment to the Penal Code allowing the penalization of subversive actions.

Slovakia: NATO Expansion Seen as 'Long-Term' Process

AU2603171296 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 22 Mar 96 p 16

[Commentary by Alena Borovickova: "Warren Christopher in the Waiting Room"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the meeting in Prague, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher told his central European partners that NATO would not leave them in the waiting room forever. It is apparent from the information available so far that the United States only confirmed in Prague its prior approach to the expansion of the alliance. Yes, but....

The outcome of the talks probably most disappointed those who are in most of a hurry. When Christopher said that such meetings are becoming a tradition, he made it quite obvious that the one in Prague was not really important for the stage before the expansion. In his address and during the working lunch, he repeatedly confirmed that it is a matter of a long-term process. He reminded his fellows of the existence of Partnership for Peace, in which the "NATO hopefuls" can do enough work.

At the Prague meeting it was clearly stated by the U.S. side that no important step made in Europe can be of an anti-Russian nature. It is evident that the United States—as opposed to several central and eastern European countries—perceive the economically and politically deformed Russia as a European power, the opinion of which must be taken into account. Some might not like it or consider it unfair, but let us be realistic. The stand of Russia has more weight for the United States and western Europe than that of any of the central European countries, maybe even more than that of all these countries combined.

So it is necessary to come to terms with the U.S. secretary of state coming to visit the waiting room (it may be Bratislava, Warsaw, or Budapest next time) a few more times. NATO and the United States produced a tool, the purpose of which is to maintain the impression that something is being done, and thereby maintain calm in the waiting room.

Among the undoubtedly beneficial aspects of any meeting is also that the U.S. secretary is able from the heights of his position to name what we sometimes attempt to avoid. This category includes, for instance, his words about the conflict between Slovakia and Hungary. If nothing else, he is letting us know that the United States is closely watching our relations with the southern neighbor.

Slovakia: Laws Passed on Pension, Minimum Wage Increase

AU2703130996 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 22 Mar 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Ivan Samel, Andrea Nozdrovicka, Robert Zitnansky: "Deputies Started Debating Territorial and Administrative Arrangement of the Slovak Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In the early evening yesterday Slovak Interior Minister Ludovit Hudek submitted to the 14th session of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] the government-sponsored bill on territorial and administrative arrangement of the Slovak Republic, which, according to Hudek, is the first from a package of laws implementing the program of public administration reform. [passage omitted]

Prior to this, the NRSR had on its agenda three social bills. According to the approved law on minimum wages, the minimum wage is going up to 2,750 Slovak korunas [Sk] as of 1 April 1996. The government's proposal was endorsed by all deputies present (103).

The law on pension increases in 1996 will go into effect on 1 June.

Under this law, all old age, disability, partial disability, widows' and orphans' pensions, and pensions for years of service granted prior to 1 January 1997 will go up by 12 percent. The law was endorsed by 130 of the 132 deputies present.

The NRSR deputies yesterday also passed the Law on Supplementary Pension Insurance of Employees and on Changes and Amendments to Some Laws. The aim of supplementary pension insurance is to obtain supplementary income in old age. The law does not apply to employees of state-subsidized organizations and self-employed persons. Both the employee and employer participate in supplementary pension insurance on the basis of a collective agreement. The contributions of both sides are deductible from taxable income.

The condition for the establishment of a supplementary insurance company is a capital deposit of Sk30 million and the preliminary agreement of 100,000 policy holders. The decision on awarding a permit for a supplementary insurance company will be made by the government. The law will go into effect on 1 July. [passage omitted]

Slovakia: Justice Minister on Penal Code Proposals

LD2603165296 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 26 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The 14th session of the National Council of the Slovak Republic resumed in

Bratislava today after a three-day break. The main points on today's agenda are the ratification of the Slovak-Hungarian basic treaty, which is expected to take place in the afternoon, and the bill amending the penal code, which the deputies are discussing first. As we well know, the amendment bill has provoked a controversy. Our correspondents, Lydia Mrazova and Michal Tvarozek, report from parliament:

[Tvarozek] Let us start by describing the situation in front of the parliament building, where a group of demonstrators are protesting with banners opposing the amendment to the penal code. [passage omitted]

[Mrazova] [passage omitted] Speaking during the parliamentary discussion, Peter Weiss, deputy for [opposition party] Joint Choice [and chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left, SDL], said that the amendment bill protects new owners [who gained property during privatization waves] and that if the bill is passed in its current form, the parties of the Socialist International will protest against the curtailment of freedoms in the Slovak Republic. [passage omitted]

During a break in the proceedings, we recorded the following interview with Justice Minister Jozef Liscak:

[Begin recording] [Tvarozek] Minister, a number of deputies have expressed their anxiety that some sections of the amendment to the Penal Code can be misused.

[Liscak] The amendment to the Penal Code in no way attempts to take advantage of the position of the coalition parties or our citizens in the democratic state. On the contrary, I would say that on the basis of the scope afforded to us by Section 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and by Sections 26 and 28 of our Constitution, we simply completed our Penal Code by adding certain legal provisions.

The bill has to be seen in a specific context. Above all, it attempts to provide a basis for punishing new forms of criminal activity occurring during the transformation process. To this end, Article 127-A clearly lays down the obligation to protect not only businesses and private and legal persons, but the state, too. I am sure that the debate will pay attention mainly to the provisions of Articles 92 and 98, which deal with criminal acts concerning peaceful gatherings organized with the intention to subvert the Republic. To date, we have been able to deal with every single instance of organized violence, but we have not been able to punish and claim criminal responsibility where organized undertakings can be described as peaceful gatherings. [passage omitted]

Not everybody understands that the underlying purpose of the bill at the time of transformation of our economy is to protect us against those who are abusing the current position of business companies and who try to benefit at the state's expense and harm the state in the process. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Slovakia: Meciar Persuades SNS To Return to Debate

AU2603202096 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 23 Mar 96 p 1

[Report by "ns": "The Slovak National Party Ignored the Parliamentary Debate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Not a single Slovak National Party [SNS] deputy was present in the meeting hall during the debate on the government-sponsored bill on constitutional arrangement lasting several hours. "I do not know why I should sit here. What boycott? It is more comfortable to sit on soft armchairs," was the comment of National Council Deputy Vitazoslav Moric when we inquired about the reason for the obvious absence of the SNS Deputies' Club from the parliamentary debate. At the time, rumors began to spread in the lobby about the alleged disagreement between the SNS and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia concerning the debated territorial arrangement. This situation was finally resolved by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar. He came to the parliament during the recess before the final vote. After his almost two-hour discussion with the SNS, the party's entire Deputies' Club finally decided to return to the meeting hall. Despite all efforts on our part, we have not managed to ascertain the real reason for the SNS conduct, or for their meeting with the prime minister. When we asked the prime minister whether he came for the final vote, he briefly retorted no, and after the meeting with the coalition partners he left the parliament building.

Slovakia: Meciar on Need To Reassess Relations With Church

AU2603200996 Bratislava SME in Slovak 25 Mar 96 pp 1-2

[Report by "bog, klo, jo": "Movement for a Democratic Slovakia Remains a Movement, and Meciar Its Chairman"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Meciar appealed to delegates to gain new members so that "in short time the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia would have 100,000 members." Meciar emphasized that it will be necessary to reassess the relationship between the church and the state. According to him, attempts are made within and without the church to use the church for political objectives, particularly on the part of the Christian Democratic Movement, and he underscored the necessity of concluding a "system of agreements"

between the state and churches. The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia also must, according to him, orient itself toward young families, housing, and population. "There are 5.3 million of us; it would be good if there were 7 million of us soon," Meciar said.

Slovakia: Daily on 'Secret Witness' Against Kovac

AU2603145496 Bratislava SME in Slovak 23 Mar 96 p 4

[Commentary by Peter Toth: "Secret Witness Upon Request"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Slovak Television (STV) carried an interview with a secret witness in the matter of the abduction of Michal Kovac, Jr. This witness testified that he participated in the kidnapping, and that it was only a "simulated kidnapping." Police Investigator Ciz confirmed that he had interrogated such a person and that the witness had fulfilled his duty as citizen. Ciz added that he will continue verifying the information as presented by the witness. It is obvious that the STV conducted the interview at the order of the organization suspected of kidnapping the president's son, and it is puzzling why Ciz did not protest against the partial revelation of the secret witness—at least to the interviewer and the cameraman. Ciz's willingness to share with the public "the version of simulated kidnapping" is also puzzling. Prior to this, he has refused to release any information. Maybe he did so because most of the evidence indicated the participation of the equipment and officers of the Slovak Intelligence Service [SIS] in the abduction of Michal Kovac, Jr. One cannot expect that Ciz would release the name of the secret witness as he did in the instance of Oskar F. Namely, he believes that the testimony of Oskar F. can be easily manipulated, while the testimony of the secret witness is the "fulfillment of the citizen's duty." We can be absolutely certain that no grenades will explode in front of his window as happened in the instance of another secret witness, Jan V. So far, only SIS agent Branislav Chilo-Ptak admitted participation in the so-called self-abduction of Michal Kovac, Jr. Incidentally, the figure that appeared on the STV as the secret witness could correspond to the physical makeup of Chilo-Ptak, who is currently criminally prosecuted, and who was promised that the prosecution would be stopped if he cooperates with the SIS in the Kovac, Jr. operation.

The broadcast of the interview with the secret witness came a little late to confirm Meciar's statement of 5 September 1995 on the self-abduction version, but right on time to bring to a head the confrontation with the new facts on the participation of the SIS in this criminal offense promised by L. Pittner for Monday [25 March].

[Bratislava SME in Slovak on 22 March on page 1 carries a report that identifies the "secret witness in the matter of Technopol" in which Kovac, Jr. was allegedly involved "as the mother of the sentenced Peter Krylov. On the basis of her testimony, Marian K. was taken into custody." She allegedly testified "as she received a promise that the prosecution of her son will be stopped if she testified against Marian K."]

Slovakia: Bohunice Atomic Plant Slated for Overhaul

AU2603145696 Bratislava SME in Slovak 22 Mar 96 p 2

[Report by "jk": "Nuclear Power Plants Allegedly Will Not Be Repaired, Nevertheless a Reconstruction Is Under Preparations in Bohunice"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Jaslovske Bohunice—According to Wolfgang Schuessel, Austrian vice chancellor and foreign minister, Prime Minister Meciar assured Vienna at a meeting on Wednesday [20 March] that the Jaslovske Bohunice [nuclear] power plant will not be repaired in the future, and that the Slovak Republic will keep its promise and close it down. At the Bohunice Atomic Power Plant (AEB), however, work is in preparation for the so-called gradual reconstruction of the JE-V-1 [first unit] to the extent determined by the Nuclear Monitoring Office's decision No. 1/94. It is planned for 1996-99, and experts estimate the cost at 5.5 million korunas [Sk]. The Rekon consortium—consisting of the Nuclear Power Plants Research Institute (VUJE), the firm Siemens, and other Slovak, Czech, and Russian companies—is supposed to become the general contractor, and the contract is to be signed this month, or, at the latest, next month. As AEB Director Tibor Mikus said last week: "We would have to have Sk20 billion to close down the V-1." That is the value of annual output of the power plant, and he added that only 12 percent of the life expectancy of the plant has been exploited. We did not manage yesterday to obtain the stand of the management of the AEB or the Slovak Power Plants.

[Bratislava SME in Slovak on 23 March on page 2 adds: "The management of the Slovak Power Plants does not know the details of the talks between the Slovak prime minister and the Austrian vice chancellor and foreign minister, and therefore it cannot comment," but it points out that the "reconstruction concerns particularly an increase in the level of nuclear safety."]

Slovakia: Economic Growth Sustained by Exports

96CH0066A Bratislava SLOVAK SPECTATOR in English 13 Feb 96 pp 1, 9

[Article by Richard Lewis: "Exports Fuel Slovakia's Economic Turnaround"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The word has gotten out that Slovakia is fashioning itself a solid economic turnaround. The gross domestic product (GDP), the main indicator of a country's overall economic performance, registered 6.6% growth in 1995 and conservative government estimates predict that growth to continue at a five percent clip in 1996. A major factor in the success of the Slovak economy has been as Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar said in a January 25 speech, its strong exports.

Indeed, Slovak exports shot up from 207 billion Sk in 1994 to 254 billion Sk in 1995, a solid 18.5 percent increase. Officials at the Ministry of the Economy expect the buoyant numbers to continue this year. "We predict that exports will grow in 1996," said Zuzana Bolemanova, the ministry's deputy director of foreign trade policy. "We're not predicting 18.5 percent growth like what happened between 1994 and 1995, but it will be growth."

Exports made up 53.8 percent of the country's GDP in 1994 and estimates place it as high as 60 percent of GDP when 1995's final returns are fully in.

However the reliance on exports can be "very dangerous," as one foreign diplomat put it.

"Everyone knows that the export structure of our economy is far from ideal," said Juraj Rencko, an analyst at the Slovak Academy of Science's (SAV) Institute of Prognostics.

Slovak exports are made up largely from production of several big industrial companies like steel-mammoth VSZ in Kosice, then Slovnaft, Duslo Sala and a few other chemical companies. About ten percent of exports are contributed by the transportation industry, especially by Komarno shipyards and Volkswagen Bratislava.

Slovakia's export market is focused heavily toward Visegrad countries (V4) and nations in the European Union (EU). In the first eleven months of 1995, 82 percent of Slovak goods ended up in these markets.

"This export structure is very vulnerable to fluctuations at the markets of destination," continued Rencko. "If the EU market boom is set back by one or two percent, we are in immediate trouble."

Foreign trade analysts said that the instability of V4 countries economies coupled with the possibility that popular EU markets for Slovak products, such as Germany, Italy and Austria, might become disinterested in Slovak goods if they can find them cheaper somewhere else, and you have got a short boom.

In order to sustain strong economic growth that will last into the future, Slovak companies are in-house streamlining.

Internal restructuring is needed to stay competitive in the markets where they export now and to maximize profits in new markets in the future. There are three basic categories of restructuring: creating a sales and marketing division, financial, and making operations more efficient.

The absence of an in-house sales and marketing division, advisors said, denies the large firms from knowing how much they should be receiving for their products. "Without the experience (of having an in-house sales and marketing division), it's very easy to be scalped," said one foreign consultant.

Trading companies such as Kerametal, which had the highest turnover, in Slovakia, and Petrimex made tremendous profits by finding markets for large manufacturing companies.

Foreign joint ventures often took advantage of Slovak companies inexperience with new markets to make a large profit also.

Some large manufacturing companies are creating their own marketing division to keep the profits for themselves. Still joint venture partners are effective at opening up new markets.

"The joint venture partner is a guarantee to the end-user that the product is of appropriate quality and that deliveries are reliable and on-time," said Lubomir Haluska, a member of Deloitte & Touche's audit and management consulting division.

"Also, joint venture partners can introduce a Slovak company to a market that otherwise would be very difficult to get into. This is beneficial for both sides."

While much attention has been paid to strategic market plans and financial restructuring, one advisor argued that equal importance should be attached to improving the product itself.

"You have to focus on the company because it's the company's operations that make the product," said James Parrish, country director of the International Executive Service Corps, a volunteer organization that assists enterprises in transition economies.

"There's no use in doing strategic market planning because the company may not be able to make it that price."

"All you hear in this country is we need more money," he said. "But you need motivated employees who want to work and make good products."

Hungary: Kovacs Views Slovakia's Interpretation of Treaty

LD2703120896 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0540 GMT 27 Mar 96

[Telephone interview with Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs by an unidentified correspondent—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Correspondent] Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs is in the line. Good morning. I do not know what the Hungarian Government can do in this situation. Do we have to take any steps at all?

[Kovacs] What we must do in any event is to consider the situation. On the one hand, there is the fact that Slovakia has, after all, ratified the basic treaty; that is, there is now no obstacle to prevent the basic treaty from becoming effective. The treaty will then have an impact on bilateral relations. It can also be referred to as an international legal document on minority rights, primarily because the treaty includes, as compulsory legal norms, three important international documents, including the often mentioned Recommendation No. 1201 by the Council of Europe.

There is, however, a negative aspect. The Slovak legislature attached to the treaty an interpretation, which, as mentioned earlier by [international legal expert] Professor Laszlo Valki, may not have any binding legal effect, but certainly indicates a certain intention in connection with its implementation.

Following this, the Hungarian Government will have to consider how to guarantee that the basic treaty will favorably effect both bilateral relations and the enforcement of minority rights. This is the first step we will take now.

[Correspondent] So, although legally it seems that there is a basic treaty, in fact there might not be a basic treaty. Aren't you afraid of this situation?

[Kovacs] No, there will be a basic treaty in fact for such an interpretation—let me call this addendum an interpretation—does not have international consequences. I was listening to the text in an earlier report by Ildiko Nagy on Hungarian radio, and this was the first time I heard what this addendum included. The second point in Ildiko Nagy's dispatch was that the Slovak legislature interpreted the treaty. I think this issue does not depend on the legislature's interpretation; the treaty should be read. Those documents that were included, such as the above-mentioned Recommendation No. 1201, should also be read.

[Correspondent] It seems, however, that the debate over the interpretation of the treaty, which was signed in Paris, has only continued with this addendum.

[Kovacs] I think, however, there are two things that are encouraging about the outcome of the dispute and particularly about the implementation of the basic treaty. One of them is that Slovakia—which, like Hungary, considers the country's Euro-Atlantic integration and its admission to the EU and NATO to be an important aim—will have to take care of its credibility; that is, if it signs a basic treaty, it will also have to implement it.

The other point is that this basic treaty was drawn up according to international norms, norms and documents of international organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Council of Europe. Slovakia is also a member of these organizations.

[Correspondent] What happens if the Slovak partner submits a treaty with this addendum to the exchange of the ratification documents?

[Kovacs] It can submit such a treaty, but it would not be the treaty we signed. A treaty can be ratified in the form it was signed, or it can be rejected. There is no third option. This supplementary resolution is only a unilateral interpretation of the treaty; it does not have any consequences for the Hungarian side.

[Correspondent] From what you have said so far, it is not difficult to conclude that, in your view, there was certainly a point to conclude this basic treaty.

[Kovacs] Naturally, yes.

[Correspondent] Thank you for the interview.

[Kovacs] Thank you.

Hungary: NATO Membership May Include Nuclear Arms Storage

LD2603224996 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 26 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] According to Gabor Szentivanyi, the spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, it cannot be ruled out that nuclear weapons may be stored in Hungary when the country becomes NATO member. [passage omitted]

Szentivanyi said that in the event of becoming a full member, other countries' soldiers might be stationed here or nuclear weapons stored our country.

Hungary: Horn Sole Nominee for Socialist Party Chairman

LD2603200596 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1800 GMT 26 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] It has been officially announced that Gyula Horn is the sole nominee for the post of chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party [HSP].

Laszlo Kovacs, chairman of the nominating committee for the Fifth HSP Congress, also said that they will propose Bela Katona or Mrs. Kosa, nee Magda Kovacs, for the post of deputy chairman if the congress amends the party statutes and creates this post. If this does not happen and the present post of executive chairman remains, then besides the two abovementioned nominees they will also propose Sandor Csintalan for this post.

Ferenc Baja and Ivan Vitanyi have been nominated for the post of HSP National Executive chairman. Laszlo Bekesi, Judit Csehak, and Sandor Nagy rejected nominations for any post.

Hungary: Grosz Claims USSR Had Role in System Change

96CH0059A Budapest TALLOZO in Hungarian 25 Jan 96 pp 155-156

[Interview with Karoly Grosz, former Communist prime minister, Gyula Thurmer, former Grosz aide and incumbent chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, and political commentators; recorded in September 1994 and broadcast by Budapest Radio program "TIZENHAT ORA" on 20 January 1996: "KGB Script, Emergency Conditions, White Terror?—Documents From and About Karoly Grosz"—introduction and commentary by Zsolt Bocskay]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The late former Prime Minister Karoly Grosz, who, at the request of the British Government, began to summarize his views on the transformation in writing, allegedly left behind several hundred pages of documents. Is all of this material going to be published? What information could the memoir contain, and what could be the fate of the reminiscences and the documents? A compilation by Zsolt Bocskay.*

[Bocskay] *We will have to wait for the publication of several hundreds of pages of notes, if they will be published at all in the near future. Hungarian television has loaned us an interview that the late executive secretary of the party held in September 1994 and which has yet to be seen by the public. Based on this brief excerpt from the several hours' long recording one can draw conclusions as to what his notes are like. Our reporter Jozsef Orosz:*

[Grosz] When, in theory, the multiparty system began to take shape, we began to ponder what kinds of parties there would be. At that time we did not "plan" to have an MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum].

[Orosz] Did you create the parties?

[Grosz] We did not create them, we helped them to come about. Thus, the parties evolved based on their inner strength. One of these was the Social Democratic Party, another one was the Smallholders Party, and the third one was something like the Peasant Party. We knew that if established, a Social Democratic Party would gain strength, and that it could be a rival, but also a partner of the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] on many issues. For this reason, we first decided about strengthening and supporting the Social Democratic Party.

[Orosz] Miklos Nemeth, Imre Pozsgay, Rezso Nyers, and Karoly Grosz. Did the four of you sit down and say that you like the Social Democrats and support them?

[Grosz] Well, it was not that simple. We sat down and pondered that if these parties gain strength and develop, the Social Democratic Party could be our rival, but it could also be our political ally regarding many issues.

[Orosz] Rezso Nyers must have been the chief lobbyist.

[Grosz] Yes, he was. At the end of the discussion we agreed that Comrade Nyers would keep in touch with the evolving and developing Social Democratic Party.

[Orosz] What assignment did Imre Pozsgay receive?

[Grosz] He received no assignment but said that he would like to deal with the rest of the parties. I do not know whether you recall this but at that time the party leadership decided that Imre Pozsgay would work with the evolving political organizations. Not too long ago I found a piece of paper on which my colleagues informed me that they were aware of 77 party groups.

[Orosz] Were these colleagues 3/3 [internal security services] agents?

[Grosz] No. These were my colleagues within the party and the apparatus.

[Orosz] Are you aware of the fact that everybody claims that you influenced the evolution of the multiparty system?

[Grosz] We never made a secret of that. The government could have decided against the establishment of parties. That, of course, would not have been an obstacle in the path of forming parties; there have been parties forming before.

[Orosz] But then, there also may be some truth to what the Social Democrats are talking about; that is, in those days the MSZMP finished them off because they planted landmines inside the party, which for decades eliminated from the Hungarian political stage this competition.

[Grosz] I know of no such landmines. Someone might have done such a thing, but I recall that we gave them an automobile, we paid for a secretary, and paid honorariums to a few people to organize their own party.

[Orosz] But a script must have existed, even if not in writing. There must have been a script for the system change, for parliamentary elections, and for the events that took place in Hungary.

[Grosz] There was a script, of course. Everyone knew that, even at the time. In those days it was questionable which system would be victorious in the global struggle between the two systems. This is the famous Brzezinsky concept, which had its directives, its schedules for technical implementation. I remember that Krjuchkov, the former chairman of the KGB, talked to us quite a lot about this matter, in great detail. One afternoon—I was still prime minister—they called to advise me that Krjuchkov would arrive at the military airport at 10 PM and that he would come to the parliament building to meet with me. We met at about 11 PM and he revealed to me the entire schedule.

[Orosz] Did he bring along the election results in a small black dressing case?

[Grosz] No, but he brought along a detailed schedule. He discussed the main political junctions of a multiparty system. He told me how parliament should play its role and how the government should be transformed. We also talked a lot about personal matters; for example, he told me who they were depending on.

[Orosz] Who were they?

[Grosz] I will not tell you that.

[Orosz] The names of the new gentlemen appeared in the KGB script?

[Grosz] Those names were also there—not the full list of names of course, because many things changed and transformed as the events progressed. Jozsef Antall's name, for example, was not mentioned at all at that time.

[Orosz] Give me another name, one that was not written down.

[Grosz] Many names were not there, but many were.

[Orosz] What kinds of junctions did the two of you talk about? About the dissolving congress?

[Grosz] The discussion much rather pertained to the party being taken apart, being torn into two, to the multiparty system. They were very much opposed to all this, they did not approve of our position. But this was no secret either, because Gorbachev had already talked about this, and quite naturally, Krjuchkov also represented this position. We also discussed the opposite views of the government and the party, and we also talked about parliament and the elections, and about changing the balance of power. They gave advice regarding the forces that should be brought in: the civil opposition, the intelligentsia.

[Orosz] The top man from the KGB appears at your place in parliament and says: Comrade Grosz, the comedy is over, drop the curtain. Is this what happened?

[Grosz] The inference was not to drop the curtain. We discussed that there would come a new period, the things we should do against it, and how we should prevent it from happening. Well, that did not turn out to be consistent with the script.

[Orosz] So then, in 1988 Krjuchkov did not deliver to you and to the party leadership the volume packed in a velvet box. Did he?

[Grosz] No. They were aware of the concept used by the opponent to topple the system. But toppling the system was not a new intention, it was only a modernized version of the old concept, because at that point in time their chances were better. The opponents recognized the tense internal conditions, the indebtedness, the dissatisfaction, the stagnant standard of living and then the declining standard of living, and the aged leadership. This is why the opponents felt that the situation was ripe for them to move. And the KGB was informed of that, and it felt that the antidote would be to strengthen and reorganize the party, to stabilize and settle the economic relations, and to settle the issues that caused tension within the party.

[Orosz] And then you, the first man of the party, the prime minister, did what they wrote in Moscow in this script. Is that so?

[Grosz] Precisely. Because what they wrote also coincided with my convictions. It is likely that the script came about because we told them at previous meetings and negotiating sessions what we wanted to have.

[Orosz] Were you the first man of Hungary or of Moscow?

[Grosz] This is an improper question. It cannot be raised the way you put it, because nothing happened we did not want to happen. And they did not interfere in any matter in which we did not let them interfere. They responded when we asked their views on a certain subject, but then they entrusted the action to us.

[Bocskay] The interview with Karoly Grosz that you just heard was made in the fall of 1994, i.e., five years after the system change. The question is to what extent the shunted politician, by quite a few of his comrades disowned politician, was able to talk objectively about the events of the recent past. One wonders, how reliable the stories are, on the basis of which a citizen could

pronounce judgment over today's political elite? How credible are the sentences pertaining to the democratic transition, and could they influence the most important personnel issues of the molding of today's socialist party? Let us keep in mind that in a Grosz interview recently published in NEPSZAVA, sentences pertaining to the present prime minister had to be somewhat rewritten by somebody. In the original version Grosz said: "I was not disappointed with Gyula Horn, however, because many people have cautioned me earlier that his human traits were weak." This statement appeared in NEPSZAVA as follows: "I have mixed feelings about Gyula Horn, however." One could surmise that this does not accurately reflect the opinion expressed by Karoly Grosz. One wonders, however, who could become the chairman of the larger ruling party and the country's head of government come springtime, if, by then, Janos Barabas puts on the market the deceased politician's reminiscences? All this will be discussed, but first we present a report from London. Vali Toth checked whether these notes were indeed prepared at the request of the British Government.

[Toth] Karoly Grosz's great political model, Margaret Thatcher, deals with Hungary several time in her bulky autobiography *The Downing Street Years*, but she does not even mention the name of the Hungarian politician. Perhaps it was Grosz's recognition of, and respect for Thatcher that created the general belief that the British Government had encouraged him to record in writing his recollections, as those related to the transformation. From the perspective of so many years, and aware of events that transpired since, it is rather unlikely that such a request came from London government circles. Perhaps everyone would prefer to forget by now having made such a request. According to diplomatic sources in London very familiar with Hungary, they believe that Karoly Grosz could have received such encouragement at one point from one or another member of the diplomatic corps at a reception or some other diplomatic function. One of the two British ambassadors working in Budapest during the period in question unequivocally confirmed in response to one of my questions: Although he had talked to Grosz several times, such things had not been discussed, even though it would have been interesting to obtain inside information about how they were coping with the difficulties of transformation. When I inquired whether this could have been a nonprotocol, courtesy question, the diplomat answered: Englishmen involved in politics were probably sincerely interested in finding out how anyone could tackle such a huge social and political change in the shadow of the Soviet Union. But on the one hand, they did not really believe that from such close perspective, the events, the recollections could be cast on paper with full candor and without bias. On the other hand, it was clear by then that Karoly Grosz would not be the key figure in this historic process. It is unlikely that we will ever find out with certainty who motivated the late head of government to write. But answering this question may not even be too essential by now.

[Bocskay] Well then, how were these notes taken? Did Karoly Grosz keep a diary contemporaneously with the events, or did he recall the most important moments of the transformation from his memory? You will hear the answer from Gyula Thurmer, the chairman of the Workers Party, who was the closest associate of, and adviser to Grosz in those days.

[Thurmer] I do not believe that he kept a diary; knowing his busy schedule at the time, he would have hardly had any time left for that. Later on, in his retirement, I paid several visits at his home in Godollo. He told me that he was engaged in organizing his reminiscences, and that he wanted to put those in writing. In my view, any written notes that might have remained should be preserved, and at some later date—perhaps when these persons no longer are near the center of power, perhaps after they deceased—the notes should be made public. I am suggesting this, because these notes do not amount to historical writing. They are subjective views, comments regarding personalities. Publishing these notes in the present situation, and especially nibbling from these notes could induce all kinds of passions. No one needs this kind of thing be that from a historical, professional, or political point of view.

[Bocskay] What was Karoly Grosz's state of mind when he wrote these reminiscences? Was he angry at the world?

[Thurmer] The first year after his retirement was probably the most difficult period for him. Then the system change occurred, and the country acquired a right-wing government. And then, after a little while, he reconciled himself with his own past and faced the present. He understood that from the standpoint of the communist movement he was not the one to be held responsible for the system change. He also might have understood that he was not strong enough to halt this process. He might have had a guilty conscience for following bad cadre policies and placing people into positions of power who then used that power to implement the system change. This is why he might have made those personal references.

[Bocskay] Did you ever discuss with him the speech he delivered in the sports complex, in which he talked about white terror? Did this matter come up when he

talked about the importance of proclaiming economic emergency conditions?

[Thurmer] He never regretted having delivered that speech in the sports complex because he felt that it was his duty to point out to society that we were at the threshold of a system change, and that such a change could take place peacefully, or as a result of violence. The matter of emergency conditions also preoccupied his mind, because he was faced with the historical experience of the events in Poland. At meetings in Warsaw Jaruzelsky suggested to him that although the 1980 proclamation of extraordinary conditions in Poland amounted to a battle won, it, unfortunately, did not result in winning the war. This motivated Karoly Grosz's attitude toward extraordinary measures. He also counted on a situation in which the Hungarian economy, as given, could collapse, irrespective of the political situation, and that one should be prepared for such collapse. Unfortunately, Miklos Nemeth—in my view in a highly indecent manner—coarsely rejected this statement by Grosz at the last KISZ [Communist Youth Organization] congress and placed a telephone call to the radio, even though he, too, knew that such measures were being discussed. Moreover, even more than what Grosz permits us to surmise had been discussed.

[Bocskay] That "much more" was that Karoly Grosz and his closest associates prepared scripts not only for an economic emergency situation but also for extraordinary conditions. Of the five copies printed in red, one was sent to the head of government. This incident could not be reported by the press at the time, and even today, no one lends his name to confirm the plan for the possible introduction of martial law. But Karoly Grosz discussed the idea of economic emergency conditions before a microphone. This was the recording Miklos Nemeth banned in those days. The Budapest Sports Complex was the location, where Grosz conversed during an intermission with the activists of the outgoing KISZ and at the same time, of the evolving DEMISZ [Democratic Youth Alliance—successor to KISZ]. Accordingly, at this time we will present not recollections, but an original, heretofore unpublished recording.

[DEMISZ activist] Don't you see a need for forming perhaps a crisis government with a higher degree of independence, greater action choices ,and more responsibility? Momentarily this might appear as a violation of democracy, but I believe that we are in the 24th hour and it would be important for the economy to become truly invigorated!

[Grosz] You are correct, I share this view, but a few weeks ago my own politburo voted down my proposal this effect. And I, like a well-disciplined soldier, take note of this decision, even though I believe that the situation is ripe for the introduction of extraordinary economic conditions. Do not misunderstand me, this would not be a military change or a change in power. It is not the democratization process that has to be slowed down, instead, the economic decision making system needs a different kind of license, but only temporarily. Within the government Miklos Nemeth had such ambitions, and this is why he established the cabinet. But it is apparent that in this governmental structure, in which collective decisions are made, no constitutional provisions exist for the chairman of the Council of Ministers—and I know this from my own experience—to make his own decisions, if his government does not render decisions. I felt that my proposal would provide the best solution for those eight to 10 transitional months before a new constitution is framed. Because this period is also crucial from an economic standpoint. But unfortunately, as politicians know, all the people on a committee do not carry identical weights. In the Politburo the sequence is not based on rank, but on the views of three members of the government who are also members of the Politburo; that is, the prime minister and the two state ministers. They play the definitive role. An executive secretary cannot permit himself to have a resolution passed by majority vote contrary to the will of these three members; a resolution that would have to be implemented by these three members. This Stalinist method must be abandoned; that is, resolutions be implemented by those who disagreed with it. Things do not work that way. And during the debate they said that for the time being they were not prepared for such a thing, and requested that this matter not be decided for the time being. And we had to agree to that.

B-H: Prlic Discusses Mujahidin, Federation on U.S. Visit

AU2603214896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 26 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Jadranko Prlic is concluding his official visit to the United States. Here is Envera Selimovic reporting from Washington:

[Begin recording] [Selimovic] The first official visit that Foreign Minister Jadranko Prlic paid to Washington is in a way directed by the Moscow ministerial meeting at which the central theme was the implementation of the civilian part of the peace agreement. The basic aim of the visit is ensuring conditions for U.S. aid in reconstructing Bosnia-Herzegovina, as most countries are waiting for the United States to make a move, Prlic said after the first round of talks with U.S. Trade Secretary Brown, the visit to the World Bank, and the meeting at the Department of State with John Kornblum, the lead man in charge of the peace agreement implementation.

Minister Prlic also visited Capitol Hill, where he heard assurances that the U.S. Congress is prepared to examine once again the decision on granting $200 million for the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

During all these talks, Minister Prlic says, there was the open question of the presence of foreign mercenaries.

[Prlic] This is a very big problem and in the talks I had with Mr. Talbott and [word indistinct] conveyed messages of Mr. Christopher, secretary of state, as well as all the people we had talks with, all congressmen and senators reiterated that issue, and many things will be conditioned upon that issue being solved.

On the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, all officials assure us, there are no Iranian fighters or mujahidin. If the opposite turns out to be true, all those people who made false promises should be punished. However, the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina should not be punished for that.

[Selimovic] As regards the Federation, Minister Prlic said in Washington that chances for overcoming differences are greater than ever. The constitution of cantons, therefore, formation of civilian authorities, should be concluded soon. The other important point is the effort to equip and train the Army of the Federation by the end of the year, which is the constitutive part of the Dayton agreement, Minister Prlic said.

To the journalists' remark that the program is still waiting to be implemented, the minister said the following:

[Prlic] That program is already being partly implemented, albeit, not with the desired speed.

[Selimovic] Foreign Minister Jadranko Prlic today concludes the official visit to the United States, will be leaving for Canada, and on 28 March will attend the (?working) celebration of the second anniversary of the Federation in Bonn. [end recording]

B-H: IFOR Says Remaining Mujahidin Must Go 'Immediately'

AU2603145396 Paris AFP in English 1346 GMT 26 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, March 26 (AFP)—Islamic volunteer fighters are still in Bosnia involved in military training, but they must leave the country "immediately," NATO said Tuesday.

"Despite public pronouncements to the contrary it is still IFOR's (Implementation Force) assessment that foreign forces remain in Bosnia in violation of the peace agreement," US Naval Captain Mark Van Dyke, a spokesman for the NATO-led IFOR, said Tuesday.

On Monday, the official Bosnian government press, quoting President Alija Izetbegovic, said "some 50-60 members of a unit of Mujahideen" remained in Bosnia.

However, in response to American calls for their removal, he protested in a letter to Senate leader Bob Dole, that these fighters were now "civilians since their unit had been disbanded."

IFOR officials said they "did not take issue" with those who had fought in the country and taken Bosnian citizenship. However, one NATO officer who requested anonymity, said: "if you came as a foreign fighter you have to leave."

Under Bosnia's Dayton peace accord, all foreign born volunteers had to leave the country by early January. The ban applies to all sides, but the clause was aimed specifically at the so-called "Mujahideen" fighters several thousand of whom fought in the Bosnian army against both Croats and Serbs.

Van Dyke said NATO was most concerned about small groups involved in training. In February NATO forces closed down a secret "terrorist" training camp in central Bosnia run by Iranians.

"They are here in violation of the peace accord. We have long passed the deadline to remove those foreign forces. They need to be expelled immediately. They have been involved in training. It needs to stop," he said.

B-H: Muratovic, Delic, Adm Smith View Freedom of Movement

AU2603203196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 26 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, Prime Minister Dr. Hasan Muratovic and Army General Rasim Delic, commander of the General Staff of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, met IFOR [Implementation Force] Commander Admiral Leighton Smith. At the meeting, they examined the current problems of implementing the peace agreement, particularly those regarding the freedom of movement. After the D+90 term expires, IFOR established rules on full freedom of movement that all sides must comply with.

Dr. Muratovic pointed to the extreme significance that the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Government attaches to freedom of movement on all roads in Bosnia-Herzegovina and called on IFOR to remove all checkpoints. The IFOR commander confirmed that there are no more obstacles to establishing commercial flights to Sarajevo and said that their realization can begin immediately.

B-H: Croat Leader Accuses International Officials of Bias

LD2603160896 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 26 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Ivan Bender, acting president of the Presidential Council of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosna, said that the Croat side is surprised by the behavior of Christian Schwarz-Schilling and Christian Klaks, aides to Carl Bildt, high representative of the international community.

According to Bender, they have openly taken the Muslim side. We shall inform the competent authorities about their behavior and most probably we shall ask for them to be recalled and removed from office, Bender said.

He also stressed that control over Bugojno belongs to the Croats and that the top person in the municipal authorities must be a Croat, as was clear from all the documents signed so far and the arbitration by Roberts Owen.

With reference to events at yesterday's session [on Muslim-Croat share of power in the canton], HABENA [Bosnian Croat agency] carries Bender's words that power is being taken from Croats in Bugojno in an illegal way. By taking mandates from two Croats, the Muslims find themselves in a position where they have one deputy more [than the Croats] and the majority rules. Croats will never agree to this, and if we do not solve the issue in a satisfactory way, there are methods to find a solution. It is worrying that the international players are tricked by the Muslims' games. We shall take the necessary measures through the Croatian Democratic Union, the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosna, and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, Bender said.

B-H: Croat Minister: Hague Tribunal Highly Politicized

AU2703120496 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 26 Mar 96 p 5

[Interview with Mato Tadic, Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation justice minister, by Josko Dadic; place and date not given: "I Have Not Seen New Hague Charges Against Croats, but I Have Heard About Them"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] We spoke to Mato Tadic, justice minister in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and justice and administration minister in the Croat republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, about The Hague Tribunal charges for war crimes, the cooperation between the authorities of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina with the tribunal, as well as the Bosniak authorities' charges against the Croats. We also spoke to Minister Tadic about the difficult situation in the Herzeg-Bosnia judiciary, particularly the unenviable position of the local judges, and the establishment of the legal system on the territories liberated in the Maestral operation.

[Dadic] What is the view of the Justice Ministry of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia concerning the demands by The Hague Tribunal for the extradition of seven indicted Croats, particularly as only one of them, Tihofil Blaskic, is a Croatian citizen with residence in Croatia, while the rest of them are residents in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Are you prepared to cooperate and to possibly extradite them?

[Tadic] The Federation Justice Ministry and the Justice and Administration Ministry of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia have pledged to cooperate with and support the International Tribunal for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia from the day it was founded. But to answer your question directly, I have to clarify the role of the ministry in relation to the courts since this is little known to the public. It is well known that the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia did not have international legitimacy and could not appear wherever there were elements of internationalism. [sentence as published]. This was also the case with the judiciary. The International Tribunal in The Hague has not once appeared with a note or visited the justice and administration ministry

of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, so there have not been any formal or legal demands for the extradition of anyone. It is true that the International Tribunal has forwarded the indictment and extradition demands for the seven Croats, among others, to the Justice Ministry of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Highly Politicized

[Dadic] What happened with these extradition demands?

[Tadic] The ministry is not authorized to make the decision on the extradition or issue arrest warrants. That is in the jurisdiction of the court determined by the Law on extradition, and in Bosnia-Herzegovina that is the Supreme Court of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since the Federation does not have the law to regulate this issue—it is currently under perpetration—or the supreme court of the Federation, this extradition demand could not be met at the level of the Federation for both legal and formal reasons. However, the International War Crimes Tribunal has forwarded the same demand to the Justice Ministry of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and my deputy in the ministry, that is, the ministry's secretary, without my knowledge—I was at the time minister in both the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina—forwarded the charges and extradition demands to the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina's Supreme Court, which met the demands of the tribunal and issued the extradition orders, the arrest warrants, and the other necessary papers. Therefore, the ministry does not decide on the extradition or arrests. Only the correspondence with the International Tribunal goes through it.

[Dadic] How would you comment on the fact that The Hague Tribunal has not indicted a single Muslim yet for crimes committed against the Croats?

[Tadic] I cannot go into the work and decisions of the International Tribunal. I can only say that, based on its work so far, it has been highly politicized.

[Dadic] Has the Croat side, primarily the commission for the investigation of war crimes of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, forwarded any evidence to the Hague Tribunal of Muslim crimes, and if so how detailed was it?

[Tadic] The representatives of the public prosecutor of the International Tribunal in The Hague on two occasions last year took over detailed evidence of war crimes committed against the Croats in 15 municipalities of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the commission for the investigation of war crimes of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia.

[Dadic] Does your ministry contact and cooperate with the Muslim commission for the investigation of war crimes?

[Tadic] I as a minister have not been contacted by anyone from that commission, but I know that the members of the commission have been in touch with some officials from my ministry in the Federation.

[Dadic] Apparently The Hague has sent your ministry in Sarajevo charges against another 13 Croats from central Bosnia, and five other Croats from western Herzegovina are also under investigation for war crimes.

[Tadic] I have heard that charges have been brought against 13 more Croats, but I have neither received nor seen them. In other words, the ministry has not received anything officially to pass on to the relevant court. [passage omitted]

Even the Dead Stand Accused

[Dadic] What about the charges against 132 Croats from central Bosnia, which were brought by the High Court in Sarajevo in November last year for alleged crimes against the Muslim population? Has the Muslim side withdrawn these since it is obviously a so-called political charge? Among the accused there are even people working for Caritas.

[Tadic] The High Court in Sarajevo has neither withdrawn nor modified the charges against the 132 Croats from central Bosnia concerning the crimes they stand accused of, obviously for purely political reasons. Among the accused there are even dead people and people who, by nature of their work, could not have committed the worst crimes specified by the penal law. Once, at the request of then-prime minister, Haris Silajdzic, I forwarded a report that I had been given by the prime minister to the High Court on the political motives of the charges, but I received a very unpleasant response from the court. [passage omitted]

B-H: Daily Blames Muslims for Federation Problems

AU2103112596 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 15 Mar 96 p 5

[Article by Mario Marusic: "What Does the Federation Mean for Whom?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The declarative support of the Muslims for the Federation with Croats and their actions (not) directed at the realization of the Federation have been more or less noticeably incongruous ever since the signing of the Washington agreement. This incongruity or insincerity from Sarajevo regarding the expression

(and carrying out) of their real intentions has, until now, not been that often considered as an obstacle for the "Federation project." The international community preferred to have a tendency to blame the Croat side for all the disputes. They did this believing or supporting Sarajevo's propaganda about "multi" this or "multi" that in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or the (supposed) equality and sovereignty of all, not only the Bosnia-Herzegovina Muslims (being the "founding nation"). Under these circumstances, the spotlight would be directed (only) at Mostar, considering (and supporting) the theory that Muslims are the greatest (and only) victims.

Different Interpretations of What Was Agreed Upon

These days, however, after reading a series of "different interpretations" of what the Bosniak side understands was agreed upon, such as the creation of the so-called Canton of Sarajevo; the exclusiveness of the federal police and attempts to make Croat policemen wear "green" [color of Muslim police uniforms]; the discovery of terrorist centers and connections with Islamic fundamentalists as well as plans to attack IFOR [Implementation Force] bases; President Izetbegovic's letters to the "citizens of Mostar"; the removal of car license plates and personal documents from Croats in Bugojno, Usora, Ravne-Brcko and other towns; etc., have clearly shown how great these incongruities between words and actions in Muslim politics are. This (finally) has also been noticed by the international officials. The Sarajevo government was warned severely, on a number of occasions last week, with statements saying that they will "regret the day they opted for close cooperation with Iran," or that their conduct toward Croats in and around Sarajevo "may bring the future of the Federation into question." From this we could therefore conclude that Sarajevo's unreasonable actions have fully revealed the main guidelines of Muslim politics. It shows that it has definitely become clear to the international officials that the Federation is a goal for the Croats, whereas it is (only) a means for the Muslims, which is what Federation President Kresimir Zubak has been constantly warning of.

It is yet to be seen what steps the international community is going to take in order to bring (after all) the Muslim authorities to their senses and to make them stop ignoring the Federation, as well as to to stop ignoring the Croats as an equal partner. There is no doubt the words of warning to President Izetbegovic were not ambiguous, and that the blame for the (too) slow realization of the Federation project goes exclusively to the Muslim side. Sarajevo will also have to take over the responsibility for the eventual failure of the Federation, and with it the uncertainty related to the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Unfortunately there are, for now, no signs that the Sarajevo authorities could change their position. Moreover, every day we are faced with more examples that prove that the Muslims are ready to go "through with it," but not in the direction drawn out in Washington, Dayton, and Rome. Izetbegovic's son, for instance, claims that the Rome Treaty on Mostar "cost the president 10 years of his life," and that the latest stooping before Croat President Tudjman seriously affected his health. In truth, the Muslim leader has been in the Sarajevo hospital for a long period of time due to heart problems, but that did not stop him from using the phrase "citizens of Mostar," and expressing his readiness to "confront your anger" (if it is known that the anger was felt only in the eastern part of Mostar, then it is obvious that Izetbegovic recognizes only one Mostar and one group of citizens—Muslim—of Mostar). He also repeated that the Muslims' "strategic goal" is still a "united Mostar, a strengthened Federation, and a preserved, free, and democratic republic."

Letter to the "Citizens of Mostar"

It is obvious that something here is not right regarding the preservation and strengthening of the Republic and the Federation, which again opens up the question of "ends and means." Izetbegovic, probably in order to clarify his intentions and what, for him, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croat represents, informed the "citizens of Mostar" of the following: "Do not be distressed at the rejoicing of some individuals from the other side of the Neretva River. Even those around Sarajevo acted arrogantly and violently, and see how they ended up." His equating of the Mostar Croats and the Pale Serbs is more than "legible," and Izetbegovic is not reluctant to threaten the Croats (who are supposed to be his partners in the joint Federation, with all the authority and rights that come from equality in sovereignty) with a fate like the one experienced by the Serbs around Sarajevo! In other words, if we are to give up the language of diplomacy, it is as if Izetbegovic is asking the Croats what they are even doing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and who gives them the right to think of a kind (some kind) of Federation!?

The "spotlight" that Izetbegovic is again trying to direct at this town, with his letter to the "citizens of Mostar," has "shone" on some other towns (especially Sarajevo) in the past few days. In this way the "spotlight" showed that (only) Mostar alone was not the problem, nor that the realization of the Federation depends on it, but that the dispute between the Croats and the Muslims is considerably more complex. Even the international

officials that are partial toward the Muslims did not really believe such statements until now. The "media massacre" of Mostar, which was exclusively to the disadvantage of the Croats, ended with the establishment of freedom of movement and the creation of joint police patrols. As soon as this happened, and the fulfillment of the Dayton agreement regulations and schedules redirected the "spotlights" onto other towns, it became obvious that the reason for all the Federation's problems were not the "Croat nationalists in Mostar," as presumed (forced upon) by the Muslim side. The key to the problem, two years after the creation of the Croat-Muslim Federation, is the different interpretation of what the Federation is, and the great incongruity between words and actions, which has never been as visible as in the last few days.

Mixed Cantons

Another theory of the Muslim partner is "What is joint (mixed), is ours." The theory seriously brings the project of the Federation's realization into question. Sarajevo's insistence on some mixed cantons really confirm suspicions that the Croats could be turned into a national minority in these territories, with the continued trend of being forced to leave the so-called democratic and civil Bosnia-Herzegovina. These mixed cantons are exactly in those areas where tens of thousands of Croats have been driven out, and a large number of Muslims have been settled, all under the multiethnic, multinational, multicultural, etc., cover. The unavoidable questions that arise are, for example, why there are no mixed cantons in the "Serb Republic." And if this is the case, should it not be decided within the Federation who has what, and make boundaries within it, and then deal with economic, transportation, and cultural problems for affiliation and cohabitation?

After the events that happened around Sarajevo, one reaches the opinion that the Muslim authorities are more and more nervous, and seem in a hurry "to get what they can." All this, while ignoring Washington, Dayton, and Rome, because these agreements, as can be concluded from Izetbegovic's messages, are not the strategic goals of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Muslims. Or, as the Thursday Sarajevo media reports: "Belgrade tore Bosnia-Herzegovina to pieces with cannons, Zagreb does it with agreements—Washington, Rome, Split...."

So, how can one unify points of view and surmount the basic focal point of the problem?

B-H: Muslim Army Reported Entering Croat Villages

LD2603182196 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 26 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Over the past few days, and in violation of agreements, the Muslim army has increasingly frequently been entering Croat villages in the Rama [Croat name for Prozor] area. Here is a report from Rama:

[Pavlovic-Cijo] Over the past few days people's minds have been focusing on reports that members of the Muslim Bosniak army have been seen in parts of Donja Rama. This is Pero Pavlovic-Cijo reporting for Croat Radio Herzeg-Bosnia.

We learned today from the headquarters of the 42d Home Guard Regiment based in Rama that, during the night of 22-23 March, a Croat house was set on fire in the village of Gornja Slatina near Usirama. This was the work of Muslim extremists.

We also learned that over the past few days a large group of armed men in uniforms of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army have been seen in an area which, according to all agreements, should be a demilitarized zone.

All responsible officials have been informed about this, and the people of Donja Rama can be assured that the security forces in the area are in control, are watching the situation, and will guarantee security in this area.

B-H: Constituent Assembly Session Postponed Until 11 Apr

AU2503205796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 25 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A session of the Federation's Constituent Assembly will be held on 11 April instead of 28 March. The decision was made at the meeting of the collegium of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation's Constituent Assembly with representatives of the clubs of deputies of political parties, and was chaired by Constituent Assembly speaker Mariofil Ljubic.

It was concluded that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation Government failed to deliver a single proposal of a legislative bill or a general act, which it was obliged to do by 25 March pursuant to the agreements reached and the Dayton accord, to the Constituent Assembly for consideration.

Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation President Kresimir Zubak informed the Constituent Assembly that a meeting devoted to the realization of the Washington agreement will be held in Petersberg on 28 March.

which he and Federation Vice President Ejup Ganic will attend. The collegium was informed that constituent assembly sessions of cantons and grand counties with a special status, requiring the presence of a number of Constituent Assembly deputies, was scheduled for the same day.

In light of everything stated above, the Constituent Assembly collegium concluded that all conditions specified by the interim rules of procedure to hold the earlier scheduled 13th session of the Constituent Assembly on 28 March have not been met. It, therefore, decided that this session be postponed until 11 April, to commence at 1100 in Sarajevo.

The representatives of the Social Democratic Party, the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats, and the Croatian Peasants Party voiced dissatisfaction with the collegium's decision, because they are of the opinion that the conditions for the postponement of the session of the Constituent Assembly's session have not been met.

B-H: Joint Civilian Commission Held in Northeast Bosnia

AU2603200896 Paris AFP in English 1851 GMT 26 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Checkpoint Zulu 20, Bosnia-Herzegovina, March 26 (AFP)—Serb and Moslem-Croat representatives met beside a minefield Tuesday to launch northeast Bosnia's first joint civilian commission.

They were immediately warned by Michael Steiner, principal deputy to High Representative Carl Bildt, that failure to cooperate with the civilian peace process may prompt world leaders to withdraw aid to rebuild Bosnia.

He also criticised the canton of Tuzla for not sending a representative, but said he was pleased so many from the former warring factions had turned up.

"If representatives of the parties do not show the necessary cooperation, or in the specific field of the Federation, do not do necessary homework, I would think that the international donors community would be less motivated to participate in the field of economic reconstruction," he said.

The meeting was held in a tent at a checkpoint in the zone of separation near Doboj with a minefield on one side and gutted homes and a wrecked tank on the other.

On the agenda was the situation in Brcko, on the border with Croatia, and discussions on freedom of movement, economic reconstruction and the return of refugees.

Although the mayors of nine towns in both Serb- and Moslem-Croat-held land were slated to turn up, many sent representatives instead.

Serb officials from Bijeljina, Doboj, Modrica and Teslic—all on Serb territory—were joined by Moslem-Croat representatives from Orasje, Usora and Tuzla.

Also present were Moslem officials-in-exile from Teslic and Doboj, while both sides sent representatives from Brcko, whose fate has yet to be agreed by international arbitration.

They were joined by officials of international organisations including aid agencies, the European Union, the World Bank and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The meeting was chaired by Steiner.

Speaking during a break in the discussions, he said five billion dollars was needed over the next three to four years to help rebuild Bosnia, and he urged donor countries to speed up the process.

"Then we can really convince the population that life in peace is worthwhile and something different to life in war," he added. "Concrete economic signals in the field of reconstruction are urgent."

Asked about the slow pace in implementing civilian aspects of the Dayton accord and the prospects for peace when NATO-led soldiers pull out, he said people "were totally fed up with war."

"I don't believe that the war would start again if IFOR (Implementation Force) leaves. People do not want that, they are fed up," he added.

"But people want to see that peace pays, and that means the population needs to see early results also in the field of economic reconstruction."

The commission is charged with implementing civilian aspects of the Dayton accord on refugees, economic reconstruction and freedom of movement.

Steiner said he hoped the next meeting in two or three weeks time could be held in Tuzla, and after that in Bijeljina.

There were no reported developments on Brcko but Felix Vargas, political advisor to northeast Bosnia area commander Major-General William Nash, said the fact that officials had met and that dialogue would continue was a "positive step."

Although Brcko's future has yet to be decided, thousands of Serb refugees from Sarajevo have been bussed into the formerly Moslem-dominated town.

B-H: Bosniak, Serb Authorities in Doboj, Teslic Meet

AU2603162496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 26 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Representatives of the civilian authorities from the Doboj and Teslic municipalities, which are under the control of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serb entity, have met for the first time today in one of the IFOR [Implementation Force] camps on the territory of Doboj municipality. The efforts hitherto on the civilian implementation of the Dayton agreement have produced no steps forward because the Serb side has explicitly rejected any contacts with civilian authorities from the Doboj and Teslic municipalities belonging to the Bosniak people, something that is directly contrary to Annex 7 of the Dayton agreement. Today's meeting of the two entities was held at the initiative of a legal advisor to U.S. General Nash.

B-H: Accord Reached To Exchange POW's Within 48 Hours

AU2603161296 Paris AFP in English 1542 GMT 26 Mar 96

[By Adrian Brown]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, March 26 (AFP)—Bosnia Moslem-Croat Federation President Kresimir Zubak said Tuesday that Croats and Serbs had reached an agreement on a prisoner exchange "in the next 48 hours."

Speaking after a meeting with Bosnian Serb leaders, Zubak told reporters: "We have agreed to go ahead with an exchange of all prisoners tomorrow (Wednesday) or the day after (Thursday)."

If the two sides keep to the agreement it would represent an important step forward in the process of getting the last of Bosnia's prisoners freed. In the last two days, progress on releases has slowed as Bosnia's three sides have backpedaled on pledges to free all their captives.

It was unclear how many people this exchange involved. However, Zubak, a Croat who heads Bosnia's Moslem-Croat federation which controls half the country said the deal concerned only Croats and Serbs.

The mainly Moslem Bosnian authorities have been pursuing their own channels for the release of Moslem prisoners held by the Serbs.

On Tuesday morning, Bosnian Serbs failed to show for a meeting on the outskirts of Sarajevo at which government officials said they expected nine Moslem PoWs to be freed.

Deputy chief of the government prisoner exchange commission Jasmin Odobasic told AFP they had expected the Serbs to release nine Moslem prisoners at the meeting on the edge of the city for 10:00 a.m. (0900 GMT).

"It was agreed on Sunday that we would meet today (Tuesday) and (the Serbs) would bring some people with him," Odobasic said.

Odobasic's boss, Amor Masovic, waited 90 minutes in a former no-mans land on a mountain road to the east of Sarajevo, but the Serbs did not show and he left, an AFP correspondent at the scene reported.

"They didn't show up, I don't know why. But it is possible that they need more time to transport the prisoners here," Masovic said. [passage omitted]

B-H: 10 Serb Soldiers Released From Mostar Prison

AU2703084896 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 25 Mar 96

[Report by Slavisa Sabljic]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ten Serb soldiers were released today at Blagaj, about 30 kilometers from Sipovo towards Kupres, at about 1600 [1500 GMT]. The soldiers were captured during the fall offensive of the Croatian Army against the Serb Republic and later transferred to Mostar prison. [passage omitted]

The exchange was carried out with the mediation of the International Red Cross Committee and in the presence of the international forces for the implementation of the Dayton Accord. There were no incidents.

B-H: Mostar's 'Indifference' to New EU Administrator

AU2603174096 Paris AFP in English 1548 GMT 26 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, March 26 (AFP)—News of Spaniard Ricardo Perez Casado's appointment as provisional administrator of Mostar was greeted with indifference Tuesday in the divided southern Bosnia-Herzegovina city.

"People aren't talking about it. If (former administrator Hans) Koschnick failed why should Mr Casado succeed?" said a student living in the eastern Moslem sector here.

Perez Casado, 50, a former mayor of Valencia in southeast Spain, replaces Koschnick who resigned in February after protests from Croats against his reunification plan for the city.

Perez Casado said Monday his job was to "heal the wounds of a city destroyed by war." Mostar remains

divided between Bosnian Croats and Moslems after a bitter 10-month war between the two communities in 1993.

Koschnick, former mayor of the western German city of Bremen, had been adminstrator since July 1994.

European Union administration of the city is due to continue perhaps until the end of the year to ensure continuity after municipal elections scheduled for the end of May.

The reunification of Mostar is considered a major test for the survival of Bosnia's Moslem-Croat Federation.

B-H: OSCE Backs Establishment of Independent Television

LD2203130196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1242 GMT 22 Mar 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Prague, March 22 (TANJUG)—The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) supports the establishment of an independent television for the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, said current OSCE Chairman and Swiss Foreign Minister Flavio Cotti.

The role of the media is very important for the development of the democratic process and especially for the forthcoming elections in Bosnia which are due to be held by September this year, Cotti said in Prague where a two-day meeting of OSCE senior officials opened Thursday.

He said that to that end the setting up of a Bosnia-wide independent television network would be very important.

Cotti said that costs for preparation, organisation and control of the elections, which OSCE is charged with under the Dayton accords, will be much higher that initially assessed but he did not specify what the sum would be.

He said that the increased costs would have to be covered by contributions from OSCE member countries.

B-H: Tuzla Radio Says Bildt Creating Own TV Network

LD2403183196 Tuzla Radio Tuzla in Serbo Croatian 1600 GMT 24 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia has been and, unfortunately, remains a test range for all forms of blackmail and diktat. In other words, such behavior is common practice among the world powers. Things are repeating themselves according to an already well-known scenario, says a commentary by our colleague Nedim Hrustambegovic.

[Hrustambegovic] Numerous reasons for such a conclusion are provided by the main sponsors of Bosnia-Herzegovina peace—the United States and the European Union. A case in point is the Rome agreement which revised Koschnick's arbitration and opened doors to the setting of conditions on the unconditional military aid to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army that was promised long ago.

Suddenly everything looks incomparably different from the honeyed words of diplomacy characteristic of the time prior to the signing of the Dayton agreement. True, a lot has changed for the better in Bosnia-Herzegovina since then, but the feeling of bitterness and justified disgruntlement lingers on. Moreover, this feeling is growing by the day.

The straw that broke the camel's back was the decision by [international High Representative] Carl Bildt and his sponsors to put a lid on the media network in our country. This is yet another example of international deceitfulness.

We are talking about the creation of Bildt's television, which, according to its inventors, should try to diminish the influence of the state-run media in Sarajevo, Siroki Brijeg, and Pale. The European Union has devised a series of moves designed to disrupt our media network. Namely, it is quite clear who today holds sway over the media network, which has been usurped by political parties. Who would gain political monopoly over Bildt's television network is also clear—the European Union, that is, foreign power centers.

In short, everything is happening in spite of our will, but it also seems that things are not going to happen exactly as Bildt and the allies imagined. We are almost certain that it will not be easy to find professionals for such a job in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Mostar, and elsewhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This does not only apply to journalists, but also to the opposition parties—in whose interest all this is allegedly being done.

The opposition is well aware that it cannot wage its political struggle through the foreign media on its home turf. This means that Bildt's television does not stand a ghost of a chance of making a breakthrough in the media world of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

True, times are hard; true, we have to put up with international scoundrels; but we have our pride—which in our nightmarish milieu could well become the decisive factor in the struggle for a single Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: RS Foreign Minister Views Effects of Dayton Agreement

AU2603191596 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian Serb) in Serbo-Croatian 21 Mar 96 p 3

[Unattributed interview with RS Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha, originally carried by SERBSKE NOWINY, a daily of Lusatian Serbs in Germany; place and date not given: "'A Three-Quarter State'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [SERBSKE NOWINY] What has the Dayton peace agreement brought for Bosnian Serbs in the multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was earlier not recognized and attacked by all powers?

[Buha] By that agreement the Serb Republic [RS] has been internationally recognized, and international forces will guarantee our borders now. We have not been given full independence, but we have "a three-quarter state," as this would be expressed in German. We have our own army, our police—all aspects of independence. In foreign policy and trade we have to act within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Had the Yugoslav nations in the country that was already falling apart been recognized before the bloodbath, it would not have come to it. The bloodbath started when multiethnic Bosnia changed into the unitary, Muslim Bosnia-Herzegovina from the cultural point of view, which was approved by the international community. All nations that so desired were allowed to become independent. Only the Bosnian Serbs were not granted that right; unitary Bosnia was imposed on us, unitary Sarajevo. I think that Dayton is the basis of our further political work; it will enable us to come closer to our aim: A merger with Serbia. In some of its aspects, the Dayton agreement is also negative for us, especially regarding the city of Sarajevo, which is the largest Serb city after Belgrade. The Serb part of Sarajevo was given to the Croatian-Muslim Federation, although Sarajevo has always been a Serb city. The largest part of the territory on which private houses and other properties are situated belonged to the Serbs. Why did we agree to all these conditions? As part of the Yugoslav delegation in Dayton we had to agree to that—we did not see any other possibility, otherwise sanctions would have been reintroduced, and the war would not be over. Do not forget that five military powers waged war against the Serb side, among them the army of the largest military alliance in the world—the NATO army, in a ratio of eight armed NATO soldiers to one armed Serb soldier. Thousands of aircraft bombs were dropped on us. In that difficult position we did not have any other choice but to sign the Dayton agreement. [passage omitted]

B-H: RS's Koljevic Comments on Dayton Accord Implementation

LD2403203596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1837 GMT 24 Mar 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kragujevac, March 24 (TANJUG)—The Vice-President of the Republika Srpska [RS], the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nikola Koljevic said Sunday that the international community wanted to smooth out painlessly occasional crises in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord and that it would not tolerate any sort of obstruction.

In an interview with a Radio station in Kragujevac, a city in central Serbia, Koljevic assessed as very positive the holding of many high-level meetings on the implementation of the Dayton Accord.

The weightiness of the Dayton Accord is thus confirmed and those who disrespect the accord are being warned that signed documents will not remain a dead letter, Koljevic said.

He pointed out that settlement of civilian issues was now crucial in Bosnia but that there lacked funds for their realization.

Koljevic said that a conference in London on March 29 would discuss these issues.

B-H: RS's Radic, Norwegian Delegation Discuss Repatriation

AU2703082896 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 25 Mar 96

[Suzana Radjen-Todoric report]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mr. Predrag Radic, president of the Banja Luka Municipal Assembly, today received a Norwegian Government delegation, headed by [name indistinct], deputy director general of the department for immigrants and refugees. Suzana Radjen-Todoric has a report.

[Radjen-Todoric] The problems of the refugees accommodated in Banja Luka and the possibility of repatriation of the refugees accommodated in Norway were the main issues of interest that were discussed by the guests from Norway. Viewing today's talks, Mr. Predrag Radic said:

[Begin Radic recording] The first thing that should be done is to create the conditions for the return of Serbs to the areas that are part of the Serb Republic in accordance with the Dayton accord, as well as for the return of the Serbs that left Drvar, Glamoc, Grahovo, Petrinja, and

the Republic of Serb Krajina in general. Once this is done, we can discuss the return of the people who are in Norway, Sweden, Germany, and so on.

I also said that we indeed need help in this, so that the municipalities and parts of the municipalities west of Banja Luka can be revitalized as soon as possible, and so that the Serb people can return there. The issue of figures is one thing, and the quality of life in the areas to which the Serbs should return is another [end Radic recording].

[Radjen-Todoric] Both sides stated that, in order to get a complete picture, meetings should be organized at which representatives from all the countries in which the refugees from the former Bosnia-Herzegovina are accommodated would meet with representatives of the entities. It was also stated that insistence should be made on the Serb refugees' accommodation being of as high a quality as possible.

B-H: CE's Tarschys Views Reasons for Sarajevo Visit

AU2203200896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 22 Mar 96

[Report by Aida Omerovic—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Omerovic] The news conference was opened by Hasan Dervisbegovic, deputy foreign minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, after which the secretary general of the Council of Europe [CE], Daniel Tarschys, stated the reasons for his visit to Sarajevo.

[Tarschys in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] First of all, we are to broaden our view of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a future CE member. We hope that Bosnia-Herzegovina will become a permanent member of the EU, and the process that leads toward that goal is in progress right now. The next move will be a visit by an envoy of the Parliamentary Assembly, scheduled for April. I am here to discuss the implementation of the peace accord, in which the CE is involved in various ways, particularly through the Council's convention on human rights. From the point of view held by the CE, the part of the peace agreement dealing with human rights is extremely important. This is also an important element for building confidence among people.

[Omerovic] As regards conditions that Bosnia-Herzegovina has to fulfill in order to become a member of this body, Tarschys said:

[Tarschys] We demand that all our future members be ready to adopt full democracy and observe human rights. We have been maintaining contacts with Bosnia-Herzegovina for several years already, and we are going in the direction of discussing its membership. Yet, the most important thing is to implement the peace agreement. We expect the coming elections to be conducted in both entities in a free, fair, and pluralistic manner, and I am sure that representatives of the Serb entity understand what our stance is on that matter. The CE accepts a country as its member after it has conducted elections, which is a rule that applies to all countries.

B-H: Kasagic, CE Official Discuss Human Rights

AU2503165396 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 22 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic talked to Daniel Tarschys, Council of Europe [CE] secretary general, in Pale today.

After the meeting, Prime Minister Kasagic stated that the discussion concerned the commission for human rights, the activity of which will begin on 27 March. The constituent assembly will be held in Sarajevo, the goal of which will be for all members to become introduced (?to one another) in order for the activity regarding the protection of human rights to finally start.

Kasagic added that the European Council for the Protection of Human Rights was also a matter of discussion, and that the Serb Republic was interested in being present in the Council for Human Rights.

Secretary General Daniel Tarschys stated that this institution expects Bosnia-Herzegovina to be united, a member country that will observe human rights in compliance with the democratic legal principles.

B-H: Serb Official Praises Primakov's Role in Moscow Talks

LD2603180996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1552 GMT 26 Mar 96

[Received by SRNA]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 26 Mar (SRNA)—Aleksa Buha, foreign minister of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, today told SRNA that "the problems stemming from the implementation of the Dayton agreement were reviewed at the ministerial Contact Group meeting in Moscow."

According to Buha, the Serb Republic representative "was an equal participant in the plenary session for the first time and could therefore present the Serb Republic's views directly," thanks to Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov and his impartial chairing of the summit.

Commenting on Primakov's role in the Contact Group meeting, Buha said that "thanks to him, Russian diplomacy has attained the character we have long been waiting for." [passage omitted]

During his stay in Moscow, Buha says, the Serb Republic delegation discussed humanitarian aid from the Russian Federation to our republic.

The first aircraft with humanitarian aid consisting of food, [word indistinct], and medical equipment should land at Banja Luka airport by the end of this week.

"I hope this is the beginning of a new phase in relations between our countries," Buha said.

B-H: Mass Grave Discovered in Hadzici

LD2503225996 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 25 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bosnia-Herzegovina television reporters were present as yet another mass grave containing bodies of Bosniaks from Hadzici was discovered today. This grave is on the road to Sarajevo near the railway line.

The number of victims is still not known because the exhumation has not yet begun. However, it is certain that the massacre was committed at the beginning of the war and that there are many similar sites. This was one of the roads used by Bosniak civilians fleeing the advancing Serb paramilitary forces. Unfortunately, there are well-founded indications that Dragan Pusara's Chetniks killed a number of people on this very road leading towards Mount Igman. Pusara was not alone; Rade Veselinovic, Nemanja Jovicic, and other criminals also tormented Hadzici Bosniaks. They used to torture and maltreat their victims in this garage and other places. [passage omitted]

Croatia: U.S. Envoy Albright Accused of Anti-Serb Bias

AU2603150496 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1530 GMT 22 Mar 96

[From the "Vise od Vesti" program]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today's program features an extensive report by our colleagues from Vukovar Radio and Television on the visit of Madeleine Albright, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, to the Srijem-Baranja district.

[Begin recording] The visiting dignitaries from the United States were received this morning in Erdut by Milan Milanovic, head of the Serb negotiating team. Their one-and-a-half hour meeting focused on implementation of the Erdut Agreement. [passage omitted]

In his statement Milanovic briefly reiterated that the Serb side would observe the Erdut agreement.

After Erdut, the convoy of the dignitaries and reporters went on to Borovo, where Mrs. Albright met with Serb refugees from the former Socialist Republic of Croatia who found refuge in the district. The main purpose of the meeting was to present the position of refugees and view ways of establishing cooperation with the United States of America. However, there was not enough time for a constructive dialogue because the protocol planned other activities for Madeleine Albright and her aides.

[Vucetic, president of the Union of RSK Refugees in Baranja] Frankly, we expected a longer meeting to present more concrete information because Mrs. Albright was especially interested in the life of refugees and displaced persons in the region and chances for their repatriation. However, the meeting was very short and I must admit I am not satisfied with such a short meeting because we could not present what we considered important and essential, i.e. that the Serb nation, even now as refugees, has 11 times more refugees than are accommodated on Croatian territory. [sentence as heard]

According to Mr. Vucetic, although there was little time, Mrs. Albright was told that the Serbs are aware of the fact that they now live in the homes of the Croats, but that the Croats, as well as the entire international community, must realize that the homes they were forced to leave in 1991 still belong to the Serbs.

After the meeting in Borovo, before leaving for Ilok, the U.S. delegation—disregarding protocol and organizers' warnings—took a walk around Vukovar, where the people threw stones at the UN vehicles to express their dissatisfaction with Mrs. Albright's unjust statements that harmed the Serb nation. Without trying to justify the citizens, it is important to say that something like that never happened to Ambassador Galbraith, General Klein, nor to any other U.S. politician who visited the district because all their statements showed that they used equal standards both for Croats and for Serbs, as opposed to Mrs. Albright, who, everyone knows, favors the Croats. [background sounds of commotion, people yelling, organizers urging guests to immediately take cover in the buses]

On her way to Ilok, Mrs. Albright talked to a Serb family exiled from western Slavonia presently living in Sarengrad. Mrs. Albright addressed a large number of Croats and Slovaks who gathered in the Ilok Catholic church and pointed out that they all have a good friend in New York called Madeleine Albright, which she probably did not say to the Serb refugees. [passage omitted]

Having seen Mrs. Albright, a small group of refugee women and children from western Slavonia protested in front of the Catholic church in Ilok, expressing their dissatisfaction with the fact that Mrs. Albright refused to speak to them. [end recording]

Croatia: Serb Refugee Official on Meeting With Albright

AU2603152496 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 22 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Madeleine Albright, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, visited the Srijem-Baranja district yesterday. She met with representatives of the Srijem-Baranja district, visited some towns, and talked to Serb refugees. Milenko Vucetic, president of Union of Serb Refugees in Baranja, was also there.

[Vucetic] I will tell you what I said yesterday in Vukovar for Vukovar Television. First of all, the meeting was scheduled..., not all Serb representatives were present. This was practically the first meeting between Mrs. Albright and the representatives of the Union of Serb Refugees in this area. We expected much more of that meeting. We thought Mrs. Albright, who is infamous for her harsh statements against the Serb side, be it the Serbs in Bosnia or in the Republic of Serb Krajina.... She did not choose the means to always blame our side for everything. We expected at least to have an hour, an hour and a half, two hours, to inform Madame Ambassador about problems of this side, which also underwent a terrible ordeal in the civil war imposed on us. Mrs. Albright was accompanied by Mr. Peter Galbraith, U.S. ambassador to Croatia, the commander of the Srijem-Baranja district, and other international representatives. We thought that they should hear us out and be informed about our problems, which are very serious.

However, I must repeat that our dissatisfaction is based on the fact that we only had 20 minutes to talk to her because their delegation was over two hours late. Our meeting was cut short to only 22 minutes because they had a meeting scheduled at the Catholic church in Ilok. Given so little time, we were unable to present the problem in its entirety. We did not even manage to fully explain some areas of the activities of our union which, in this area alone, gathers over 100,000 people. Yet, we must never forget that we actually represent over 600,000 people exiled from Croatia now living on the territory of the Serb Republic, Yugoslavia, and the Srijem-Baranja district.

The problem, which must be dealt with in its entirety on the basis of the Dayton Accord which we support and the UN Security Council resolution, gives us a right to return. At the meeting, we wanted to underline that right and demand an answer from those who we believe are the architects of those agreements, how they envisage our return and safety in our homeland, including rebuilding and other problems. We could present only a fragment of our problem and that is the cause of our discontent. [passage omitted]

We must be aware of the fact that this situation takes a heavy toll on the entire corps of Serb refugees from Croatia and that their position is the most precarious one. Consequently, this problem is not to be solved by the Government of Yugoslavia nor by our leadership in the Srijem-Baranja district. The problem must be solved by the international community because it undertook to solve it. We thought it was their duty to hear us out and consult us on the methods for a joint action of our return because that is our prerogative, not just a dream. We have a right to return to the place we were forced to leave.

You know that Mrs. Albright is not particularly liked by the Serbs. Not because we are accustomed not to like certain people but because of her statements. You have heard about the incident that happened yesterday, after the rushed meeting. I understand our people, I understand their revolt. However, we should not have given her the material she was expecting during her visit. We should not have done that because that is why Madame Ambassador went out in the street, although that was not planned. She knew that a large number of people gathered there. I think the incident was to her benefit and very harmful to us, the Serbs.

We are not like that. Why do we not leave such methods to those who staged similar incidents in Mostar and other places. They specialize in such methods, while the Serbs do not use such methods and there is no need for them. We are a proud nation that is able to present its view and find a solution to our problems in a dignified manner.

Croatia: Tudjman, Turkey's Demirel Discuss Bosnia

LD2603195996 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 26 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] President of the Republic Dr. Franjo Tudjman had a telephone conversation today with Turkish President Suleyman Demirel. The two presidents exchanged information in connection with developments in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina and discussed the overall state of Croatian-Turkish relations. A high degree of concurrence of views was expressed, the office of the president of the republic reports.

Croatia: Vukovar Hospital Doctors Testify Before Tribunal

AU2603212396 Paris AFP in English 2108 GMT 26 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Hague, March 26 (AFP)—Doctors from a bombed-out hospital in Vukovar gave evidence Tuesday to the UN war crimes tribunal as it resumed hearings on three ex-Yugoslav army officers accused of ordering the death of 261 patients.

The International Criminal Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia has blamed the three officers, Colonel Mile Mrksic, 48, Captain Miroslav Radic, 35, and Major Veselin Sljivancanin, 42, for the November 1991 massacre of 261 non-Serb patients who were dragged from their hospital beds in the eastern Croatian town of Vukovar and murdered.

Vesna Bosanac, director of the hospital during the three months of siege between September and November 1991, said Serb authorities forced her to leave the premises before the patients were evacuated. She said that on her return, she found only women, children and old people, all of them terrified.

Bosanac had to care for thousands of Croats who took refuge in the hospital, which was constantly bombed. She estimated that the hospital was hit approximately 200 times by shells, at the same time as it was receiving 60 more wounded every day.

Bosanac also criticised the international community, arguing that "international organisations could have exercised sufficient political pressure to prevent Serb aggression."

"Each time I speak about Vukovar, I speak a great deal, but I never have the impression that I have said enough," she added.

Neda Striber, who was responsible for 24 patients on the day when the Serb army descended on the hospital, said she was forced to attend a meeting during which most of her charges disappeared.

"Only two women were left," she said, and blamed Sljivancanin for the disappearance of the rest.

However, she said she did not know whether the patients were ill-treated during the evacuation.

She charged it was Sljivancanin who took control of the hospital following the fall of Vukovar and replaced the personnel of the Croatian hospital with Serb military doctors.

Hearings in the case began last Wednesday with testimony by experts who explained to the court, with the aid of video footage, the historical context of the Yugoslav crisis and then recalled the Yugoslav army's attack on Vukovar.

The trio, who are still at large, cannot yet be tried by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia here because its legal rules, based on English law, do not allow trials in absentia.

The hearings should allow the court to decide on whether to issue an international arrest warrant against the three.

Croatia: Blaskic's Lawyer Said To Be Buying Time

AU2603181696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 26 Mar 96

[Report by Nada al-Issa from Zagreb]

[FBIS Translated Text] People indicted for war crimes cannot be defended while on bail, so this also applies to Major General Blaskic. This was said in The Hague Tribunal's reply to Blaskic's Zagreb lawyer, Zvonimir Hodak, who had requested that, during the trial and investigation, the general should not be in prison but under a loose house arrest. For that reason, the [words indistinct] was postponed again, so the first court appearance convened for Friday 29 March will be held without the indicted general.

Zagreb legal experts say that this is only an attempt to buy time as the Republic of Croatia, just as any other state, has no right to set conditions on The Hague Tribunal. Blaskic's lawyer nevertheless announced that Blaskic will travel to The Hague next week.

Hodak allegedly does not know anything about the other six Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats from The Hague list because he says that Blaskic's case is separate; he is employed in the Republic of Croatia, in the Croatian Army, so the Republic of Croatia is responsible for him, while the others are not employed in Croatia so Bosnia-Herzegovina and IFOR [Implementation Force] are responsible for their arrest. They are all somewhere in Bosnia, the lawyer says, so let IFOR catch them and hand them over to The Hague Tribunal.

However, IFOR will hardly be able to arrest Dario Kordic, who—it is a public secret—is living in Zagreb, in the same building as Blaskic, in fact next door. In reply to the remark that nobody has so far demanded any extradition from Bosnia-Herzegovina, but from Croatia, Hodak says that it is true but that formally and legally Bosnia-Herzegovina is responsible for them.

This is an obvious example of an attempt to gain time, as it is also clear to The Hague Tribunal that only Croatia can force these people to go to The Hague. Time can perhaps be bought, but not for ever because war crimes are not at all subject to a statute of limitations.

The former hapless citizens of Ahmici and Stupni Dol are no more, and this is why one must go to The Hague [words indistinct].

Croatia: E. Slavonia Official Rejects Aid via Zagreb

AU2603195596 Beli Manastir Televizija Republike Srpske Krajine in Serbo-Croatian 1915 GMT 22 Mar 96

[Unattributed report]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The European Community delegation for economic aid to the Srijem-Baranja district visited Beli Manastir for the second time in the past seven days. European businessmen met with the representatives of "Belje Holding" to discuss the possibility of establishing full-fledged relations regarding the implementation of the program for reconstruction and revitalization of the district's economy. Gerard Fisher, head of UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] civilian affairs, and his aides visited the Executive Council of the Beli Manastir municipality to that end.

[Begin recording] When, how much, who, and under what terms members of the European Community want to help the implementation of the program for reconstruction and revitalization of Baranja's economy least depends on the authorities and businessmen of the district. Beli Manastir businesses are prepared to take an active part in the economy of Europe, as well as to cooperate with all foreign players willing to promote regional development. Naturally, since Baranja has always been a Serb country, those who are responsible for the development of Baranja's economy cannot accept any political blackmail regarding the status of the Srijem-Baranja district. These lines are the essence

of the meeting between the representatives of one of the sectors of the European Community in charge of economic questions, members of the "Belje Holding" representatives, and leaders of the Executive Council of the Beli Manastir Municipal Assembly. European representatives said that the European Community is willing to lend full financial and material help to the program of rebuilding and revitalizating the district's economy. It was stated that the European Community does not intend to invest its capital in projects without sound economic prospects. [end recording]

[Passage omitted] Today's meeting between representatives of the European Community and "Belje Holding" top officials emphasized that, for the time being, one of the main goals—regulated by the Erdut Agreement as well as other documents of the current peace process—is to plan and organize production. In other words—the so-called creators of a new world order are hopefully also aware of that, which was confirmed at today's meeting in "Belje Holding"—there is no survival and existence in Baranja without work. The Serb side, respecting the provisions of the peace documents, is absolutely willing to cooperate in every domain. However, our readiness to cooperate must never be interpreted as atonement for the awakening of Serb national awareness. That is why the Baranja Serbs, fully respecting basic civil and human rights of all minorities in the district, in future negotiations on the future of the Srijem-Baranja district, will be adamant that its interests be respected in keeping with current international human-rights conventions.

The meeting between representatives of the EU committee for economic relations and leaders of the "Belje Holding" served as a kind of introduction into all what was said at today's meeting between Vaso Zigic, president of Beli Manastir Executive Council, and Gerard Fisher, head of UNTAES civilian affairs. Mr. Zigic reminded Gerard Fisher that the Serbs from the Srijem-Baranja district are absolutely willing to cooperate but not at their own expense. In short, Vaso Zigic has made it clear that the Srijem-Baranja district will not accept any help from the international community or even make business deals if they are mediated by Croatian authorities. That is to say, without Zagreb in any case. Without Zagreb, the Serbs are prepared to negotiate with the entire world. Through Zagreb—no way! Obviously aware of the superiority of the Srijem-Baranja district in relation to Croatian parts of Slavonia and Baranja, Gerard Fisher promised to do everything within his mandate as head of UNTAES civilian affairs to help the Serb side with the goal of forever eradicating the desire to use the war option for solving problems and to make the Srijem-Baranja district into a shining example of how the local authorities and the relations between people in general can affirm the interests of the international community with regard to basic human and civil rights.

Croatia: W. Slavonia Serbs Still Pressured To Leave

AU2603182496 Beli Manastir Televizija Republike Srpske Krajine in Serbo-Croatian 1915 GMT 22 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] More than a year after the aggression against western Slavonia and the exile of most Serbs from the area, the Croatian authorities continue to exert all kinds of pressure on the remaining Serb population in order to make them leave. The latest report of the center for human rights protection in the western Slavonian village of Galenica talks about the pressure in the form of legal and administrative loopholes, restrictions regarding the issue of identification documents, employment, payment of pensions, health care, education, and payment for giving birth. Housebreaking and theft are still recorded, mostly during moves or in households whose owners are in hospitals or prisons.

The report says that, although complaints were lodged with the local police, no arrests were made, nor were there any trials or convictions. The situation is exacerbated with the settlement of 426 Croatian refugees, only 100 of whom have valid identification papers. Furthermore, it is feared that their presence will only bring more tension to the area.

Activists of the center for human rights warn against the constant threats made against the Serbs, who fear for their lives. The center describes the life of the remaining Serbs as resembling a ghetto. According to them, one Serb was killed in the center of Pakrac in January. In these circumstances, the existence of the western Slavonia Serbs grows more uncertain day by day. The process of repatriation is very slow because Croatia, for instance, changed and amended the regulations on joining separated families, which is presently the only way to return, four times.

Croatia: Sarajevo Croats Protest Treatment by EU

LD2603152496 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 26 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Sarajevo town committee of the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] today sent two letters: one to Christian Schwarz-Schilling, the international mediator for the [Muslim-Croat] Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the other to Carl Bildt, the mediator for the implementation of the civilian part of the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace accord. Both letters draw attention to the illegitimacy of the Sarajevo canton. Vladimir Bilic reports for Radio Croatia:

[Bilic] [Passage omitted] In its letter to Carl Bildt, the Sarajevo HDZ warns the high representative [Bildt] that he has been sent by the international community to preserve Sarajevo's multinational setup and to allow neither discrimination nor hegemony. Unfortunately, here in Sarajevo everything that is being done seems to be designed to disenfranchise someone.

The Croat side can no longer justify its participation in the work of your commissions because the Croats are not being treated as federal partners and the Muslim side is continuing to impose its will. So, until we get assurances that as a constituent people, we shall be treated on an equal footing in future talks, we are ceasing to take part in the work of the town commissions, the Sarajevo HDZ town committee says in its letter to Carl Bildt.

Croatia: Rights Activist Says Serb Return Blocked

LD2303130196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1205 GMT 23 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, March 23 (TANJUG)—President of the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights Ivan Zvonimir Cicak accused Croatia of systematically blocking the return of refugee Serbs with all possible means.

'The refugee Serbs are Croatian citizens and it is said here they will not be allowed to return. They can only do so individually on the basis of individual requests,' Cicak said in an interview published Saturday by the RIJEKA NOVI LIST.

Some 300,000 Serbs fled ahead of the Croatian Army's aggression on the Republic of Serb Krajina in May and August last year. Only several thousand of them remained, mostly elderly, who are subjected to psychological and physical harassment.

The world insists on the Serbs' return because their failing to do so would legalise results of ethnic cleansing, Cicak said.

Last year was the worst because that is when the most brutal human rights violations were committed, Cicak said.

He said that U.N. reports in its documents that about several hundred people were killed after Operation Storm (Croatia's August aggression on northern and southern parts of the Republic of Serb Krajina) while some 900 people were killed during the operation itself.

'Not only do Croatian authorities fail to respect the highest human rights standards but disregard and violation of human rights is their political platform,' Cicak said.

Many Serbs who remained in Croatia at the invitation of President Franjo Tudjman are now being expelled from their homes in which Croats move in while the authorities continue colonising areas by bringing in refugees from Bosnia into Serb homes, Cicak said.

FYROM: Gligorov Calls For 'Full' Integration Into EU

AU2603191696 Skopje MIC in English 26 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Government of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] held its 66th session yesterday. President Gligorov also attended this session at which the platform for negotiations between the Macedonian delegation for signing an agreement on cooperation with the European Union was established, the Information Secretariat announced.

Welcoming President Gligorov, Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski emphasized that the agreement on cooperation between the Republic of Macedonia and the European Union offers new relations with the Union and with each member separately, in all areas of life. "To our country, the agreement means a step closer in the realization of the ultimate goal—long-term and full inclusion of the Republic of Macedonia in the European Union, which practically means the fulfillment of our country's strategic goals, laid down a couple of years ago. Macedonia's aspirations for joining the European integrations, which seemed as a far-fetched perspective not so long ago, have already come true or are in the course of being realized," Prime Minister Crvenkovski said.

Addressing the members of the government, President Gligorov thanked them for the possibility to take part in the discussion on such an important issue, emphasizing that the start of the negotiations on cooperation with the European Union is the final phase in a longer process of leading a principled policy, which gave Macedonia its image in the international community.

At the start of the negotiations with the European Union, Gligorov assessed, it should be stressed in a clear and unambiguous way that Macedonia expects the Union to open up to it much more than the way it is stipulated in the draft-agreement of the European Commission. The intention of some ideas in the Union to condition the process of accession of new members with a previous regional "community" or cooperation between the former Yugoslav republics or between all Balkan state, cannot be justified, as every country separately has its own particularities and level of achievement of the standards for accession to the Union. Being connected in some kind of a collective acceptance, Gligorov said, is neither realistic nor good. That means that the Union, upon taking a stand in terms of signing an agreement with the Republic of Macedonia, should start from the stand that until now, Macedonia has realized every phase on time, which has made it possible for it to continue the evolutionary path of association of the Republic of Macedonia with the European Union.

President Gligorov's suggestions tabled at the session were accepted by the Macedonian Government and will be built in the general principles of the platform for negotiations with the European Union. After reviewing the draft-agreement, the government established the platform for negotiations with the European Union, which stipulates the Macedonian views and opinions on certain parts of the text of the agreement, and decided on the set up of the negotiating team.

The government also reviewed and accepted the proposal on the adoption of a law on the procedure for collecting voters' signatures for the proposal and adoption of a law on holding referendum and the submittal of a proposal for making amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, with a draft-law. The basic principles of this proposal are direct participation of the citizens in the power in the Republic. An important component in the text is the verification of the credibility of the signatures, as well as the checking of the number of signatures by the initiator of the collection of signatures.

Poland: Foreign Minister Meets Iraqi Official

JN2703083496 Baghdad INA in Arabic 2015 GMT 26 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 26 Mar (INA)—Dariusz Rosati, Polish minister of foreign affairs, affirmed that his country calls for lifting the blockade on the Iraqi people. He said he values the progress and positive cooperation achieved in Iraq's relationship with the UN Security Council [UNSC].

During a meeting with Riyad al-Qaysi, under secretary at the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rosati described Polish-Iraqi relations as wide-ranging and traditional. He added that there are good prospects for the growth and development of these relations.

The Iraqi Foreign Ministry under secretary explained the latest developments in the relationship between Iraq and the UNSC. He also briefed Rosati on Iraq's positive cooperation with the UN Special Commission.

Dr. Riyad al-Qaysi urged Poland, a nonpermanent UNSC member, to do its best to support the Iraqi cause and Iraq's right to have the blockade lifted, particularly because Iraq has fulfilled all of its commitments contained in the relevant UNSC resolutions.

The Foreign Ministry under secretary spoke about bilateral ties, expressing Iraq's sincere desire to promote them in all areas in the interest of the peoples of the two friendly countries.

Dr. Riyad al-Qaysi also met with Miro Jefic [name as transliterated], Polish Foreign Ministry under secretary, earlier in the day. They reviewed the latest developments in the relationship between Iraq and the UNSC, bilateral ties, and the ways to promote them.

Poland: Trial of Former Interior Minister Begins

LD2703100496 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0800 GMT 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The trial of former Interior Minister Antoni Macierewicz starts today at the provincial court in Warsaw. He is charged with breaking the law on state secrecy. On 4 June 1992, when carrying out the Sejm's vetting statute as interior minister, Macierewicz passed to the Convent of Seniors [leading Sejm officials] and others a list of 64 parliament members and important state officials alleged to be collaborators of UB and the SB [both secret services under communist rule]. The prosecutor accuses Macierewicz of illegally lowering the security classification of Interior Ministry documents from top secret to secret. Top secret documents can be revealed only to the courts or to the prosecutor's office. The trial is to be held behind closed doors.

Poland: Uproar at Trial of Former Interior Minister

LD2703115696 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 1000 GMT 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The trial of former Interior Minister Antoni Macierewicz, charged with violating the law on state secrecy in 1992, has started at the provincial court in Warsaw.

[Correspondent Mira Nowakowska] The trial of Antoni Macierewicz, which is closed to the press and public, turned into a demonstration by members of the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland [ROP]. Contrary to expectations, the prosecutor did not even make public the reading of the indictment against Macierewicz. Earlier, however, his supporters got into the court building and courtroom. On the instructions of the prosecutor, the police removed the public that started to shout: Disgrace!, Communist court!, Bring the agents to trial!, and We want vetting. There were scuffles with the police. About 300 demonstrators are standing in front of the courtroom, chanting slogans and singing the national anthem. Antoni Macierewicz is accused of violating the law on state secrecy in 1992 during the preparation, and passing on to the top state bodies a list of alleged secret UB and SB [former secret services under communist rule] collaborators. Because the case concerns a secret vital for the security of the state, Macierewicz could get from one to 10 years' imprisonment. This is Mira Nowakowska reporting from the provincial court. [end Nowakowska]

The prosecutor's office submitted the indictment to court in September 1993. Prosecutor Stefan Szostakiewicz, head of the Warsaw provincial prosecutor's office, said on the Third Program yesterday that the matter was being examined only following a lapse of three years, not because of political considerations but because it had to wait its turn.

Poland: NIK Accuses Phone Company of Misusing Funds

WS2703114596 Gdansk DZIENNIK BALTYCKI in Polish 11 Mar 96 p 3

[Article by Jan Kreft: "Dear Numbers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *A few days ago, Polish Telecommunication SA [TP] was granted a $25 million credit, the last one earmarked for modernization of the telecommunications network in Gdansk Voivodship. According to the Supreme Board of Control [NIK], some of the credits contracted by the TP thus far have cost phone subscribers dearly, because it is they who, by paying telephone bills, support the company. Moreover, the TP*

has spent several billion old zlotys [Z] on various studies that, when not used in the Gdansk deal with AT&T, landed in a trash can.

Before the TP signed a contract with AT&T, the problem of how the venture should be financed hung in the balance for a long time. Someone came up with the idea that the new phone users should pay off the credits contracted by the TP for installation of new phones. The proposal was long considered, and painstaking negotiations were held over whether the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD], among others, should be engaged in the venture.

In the summer of 1994, when the TP broke off negotiations with the EBRD, the analyses that were ordered earlier hit the drawers. In this way, for instance, a study drafted by the Hunton & Williams consulting firm was not used, for which, according to the NIK report, the TP paid Z16 billion. Studies prepared by another company—Barcley's—this time for Z2.2 billion, were not used either. And that was just the tip of the iceberg.

Two Heads Are Better Than One [subhead]

According to NIK, a number of deals (and only those contracted in the years 1993-1994 were scrutinized) were signed violating the binding rules within TP. "Apart from a failure to inform the supervisory council about the contracted deals, they were made by individuals who were not eligible to make them; contractors were not selected through tender procedure, and the contractors' responsibilities were so inaccurate that it led to disputes when the studies were okayed."

As an example, NIK gives a February 1993 contract made with Hunton & Williams. It was an odd contract, indeed, "because neither the completion date, the scope of work, remuneration, approval procedure, nor the mode of contract termination were determined. The Hunton & Williams offer had been accepted by one (instead of two) members of the TP executive board, before the body made a decision about employing Hunton & Williams as a legal adviser."

Hunton & Williams was given the task of drafting a study on an analysis of credit security in contracts with the World Bank and AT&T, as well as determining the results of a prospective withdrawal from the AT&T contract. TP paid Z8.5 billion for that until the end of 1994. When the TP executive board put the payment of subsequent invoices issued by Hunton & Williams on hold, an agreement was reached and Z7.5 billion was paid. NIK revealed later that "the materials furnished by Hunton & Williams were not implemented by any TP organizational units, nor were they used during the preparation of a contract with AT&T to expand the telecommunications network in Gdansk Voivoship."

From One Cashier To Another

The TP did not handle the contracting of credits any better. In 1994, the TP made 14 credit deals for Z13.9 trillion, of which Z2.7 billion [figures as published] was planned for 1994. The results of these ventures, which were financed then, can be seen now. The problem is that, because of the delayed start and completion of the investment, only Z1.8 trillion of the mentioned sum were used, and the TP did not secure itself in the agreements with the banks against such a possibility.

NIK says that in only four contracts did the TP agree on the possibility of changing the sum and the appointed time without any consequences for the company. The TP paid Z9.1 billion to the banks on that score. The NIK findings lead to the conclusion that contracting some credits did not make any sense at all or was burdened with too great a risk.

As early as last September, the TP made two agreements with the Bank of Economic Initiatives [BIG] on a credit totaling Z40 billion. In the agreement, the interest was settled at 50 percent, although the average interest rate of credits amounted to 46-48 percent at that time. One of the forms of securing the credits was to block the TP's fixed deposits for one to three years just at BIG. The interest on those deposits was lower than the interest on the credit by seven to nine points. Because of the freeze and the fixed credit conditions, the TP bore additional costs totaling Z5.1 billion. BIG made money—the phone users bore the costs.

In September 1994, when the TP contracted a Z150-billion investment credit at the Amerbank SA in Warsaw, its interest was fixed at 34 percent. At the same time, the TP had fixed deposits at Polish banks totaling Z150 billion, a majority of which were just at...the Amerbank SA. Their interest amounted to merely 19.25-24.75 percent, at least on to nine points less than the interest on the credit, says NIK.

At the end of 1993, the TP had too many commitments, which, according to NIK, posed the threat of losing financial liquidity. A decision was made at that time about contracting turnover credits totaling Z198 billion (including Z100 billion from BIG SA and Z37.5 billion from the Postal Bank SA). At the same time, on 31 December 1993, New Year's Eve, the TP purchased Z26.9 billion worth of Bank Pocztowy shares, and, a little earlier, Z44.8 billion worth of BIG shares.

[illegible] copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination

The Customer Will Pay

NIK concludes: "The audit results indicate that the reasons for the revealed irregularities were not exclusively sloppy, wasteful, and inexpedient implementation of partial enterprises concerning the individual contracts. They were also the result of an inadequate system of managing the company. (...) Organizational inertia and chaos were also demonstrated by the absence of rules for recording contracts, an incomplete recognition of overhaul and investment needs. (...) The consequences of such a situation, because of an overestimation of the activity costs, were disadvantageous to the financial standing of the company. The growth of costs on that score was felt, most of all, by TP customers; it was manifested by increased prices for services, as well as by a delay in hooking up new phone subscribers."

In other words, for an average Pole, picking up the receiver every day and having sporadic contact with the TP, the way the company used the credits is of great importance. The less costly and better spent credits are, the cheaper services are, or at least they should be. The more expensive they are, the bills will be higher for the same service.

Unfortunately, an average Pole cannot take offense and use a rival telecommunications network. He cannot because there is none. And, because of the lack of government decisions, there will be no such competitor for a long time.

According to the Plan

Ryszard Ceglarski, the deputy director of the TP district in Gdansk, gave assurances that the contracting and installation of new phones will be concluded at the end of this year. There are no major delays. Thus far, under the contract with AT&T, the TP has obtained four credits, among others, from the Bank of Exports Development and from London banks. Ceglarski also noted that credit contracts on investments in the Gdansk Voivodship are made by the TP executive board in Warsaw.

Poland: Spokesman on Dismissal of Military Intelligence Chief

LD2603214496 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1800 GMT 26 Mar 96

[Quotation marks denote recorded passages]

[FBIS Translated Text] Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski has dismissed General Konstantin Malejczyk, head of the Military Intelligence Service [WSI], and has appointed Commodore Kazimierz Glowacki to this post. The ministry's spokesman, Lieutenant Colonel Eugeniusz Mleczak, said in a statement for the Radio Information Agency that the reason for this change is that the minister supported rotation in top posts and the reorganization of the ministry and the Army in connection with our closer ties to NATO.

[Mleczak] "In the Army, there are no posts you can hold for life. The simple truth is that Minister Dobrzanski is in favor of rotation in certain top posts. Gen. Malejczyk has done a lot of good for the WSI. He is not retiring. The minister has other plans for him. One should view the dismissal against the background of the process of the reorganization and restructuring of the Defense Ministry and the armed forces. We are getting closer to NATO, and the tasks and conditions are changing. Minister Dobrzanski sees that there is a need for changes in the sphere of the organization and leadership of the ministry, including the WSI."

[Announcer] The Defense Ministry spokesman also said that it is still not certain what duties will be given to the former WSI head.

[Mleczak] "Minister Dobrzanski is at present not entrusting Gen. Malejczyk with any post. He is at the so-called disposal of the minister. I think he will soon be getting some sort of offer."

Poland: Conditions for Defense System Discussed

96EP0036A Warsaw MYSL WOJSKOWA in Polish Jan-Feb 96 pp 11-16

[Article by Professor Kazimierz Nozko: "Conditions for a Polish Defense System"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The national defense system comprises not only the Armed Forces, but also a broad range of unusually important factors of a political, economic, social, scientific-technical, and demographic nature. Some of them should be considered by civilian experts. At the same time, it must be strongly emphasized that aspects of this system cannot be divided into purely military and purely civilian, because both domains are closely linked, and penetrate and condition each other. Noteworthy here is the experience of Western countries (Germany, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland), which should be utilized.

Of course, utilizing that experience does not mean emulating or uncritically accepting foreign models. Allowance should be made for specific Polish conditions and domestic and foreign factors.

It should also be borne in mind that national defense cannot be reduced to merely evaluating our own possibilities and defense potential; in addition, similar aspects concerning the eventual enemy and the forces of allied

countries should be evaluated comprehensively and in depth. Thus, to be evaluated are both military problems and those belonging in the civilian domain, especially from the standpoint of their direct or indirect effect on the evolution of the national defense system. Furthermore, the domain of eventual threats, both military and nonmilitary ones, to national security should be thoroughly and broadly evaluated.

At the same time, any evaluation of nonmilitary and military threats and the concepts and premises of the national defense system should be evaluated in a specific context, both domestic and that of the eventual enemy, as well as with regard to the present and to the near and distant future.

Any one-sided evaluation and forecast leads to mistaken conclusions and improper concepts and organizational premises of the national defense system, as well as to poor solutions with regard to the Armed Forces. Thus, when considered in isolation from each other, political and military issues will adversely affect both the political and military domains, and in sum they may harm the national defense system.

Reflections on the defense system are of a controversial nature, in the sense that during the transition period many important problems are not, and cannot be, unequivocally resolved, because often the legal foundations for this do not exist. There also exist many conflicting—sometimes officially—views, arbitrary decisions, and political emotions linked most often to partisan or spur-of-the-moment interests.

Nowadays a significant feature of the national defense system is that it is established not only with the object of repelling eventual armed aggression by an enemy but also, and perhaps primarily, for the purpose of effectively averting and counteracting the rise of crisis situations which may occur owing to nonmilitary threats. This is a particularly important function of the defense system, because such threats may arise unexpectedly, in various periods and under various guises. They are, moreover, less explicit than, e.g., military threats, although the latter increasingly often have, and will continue to have, a camouflaged form.

The problems of the national defense system are highly controversial owing to, among other things, the unique, specific Polish domestic, foreign, and historical conditioning factors. In view of the multiplicity of these factors I will focus on analyzing the ones I consider most important. First of all, attention should be paid to the geopolitical and geostrategic location of our country in Europe, which certainly is special.

That is because Poland is a kind of bridge between the East and the West. Its central location vis-a-vis the other European countries has afforded it tremendous political, economic, and cultural opportunities, but it has also been the cause of many threats and national misfortunes with tragic consequences. Historic periods of glory and might were intertwined with national disasters and the downfall of statehood, especially whenever Poland's geopolitical position was not exploited to spur economic growth and exert political influence on neighbors, thus assuring her tranquil and constructive development. Moreover, the political and military domination by Poland's neighbors occurred when national defense was neglected or attempts were made to organize it in haste and without the internal consolidation of the entire society.

At present, taking into account the historical context, the opportunity afforded by Poland's special location in Europe should be perceived and rationally exploited. That is because we adjoin seven countries with extremely different economic structures and political tendencies. To each we are linked by a centuries-long history marked by both positive and negative events. These should now be reappraised and objectively and exhaustively evaluated, so as to nurture what has been good, constructive, and beneficial to both sides, and to isolate and eliminate anything that is obstructive and has contributed to national failures and disasters. Conclusions should be drawn from those historical events which do not promote the development of good-neighbor relations, which complicate cooperation, and which may prompt suspicions or cause the rise of threats. Aside from all this, when creating and elaborating a modern defense system, it should be suitably differentiated vis-a-vis the individual countries adjoining Poland.

The present political conditions require that the defense system be primarily built on the foundation of our own economic possibilities and properly prepared armed and nonmilitary forces which would credibly and effectively counteract all dangers to national security.

But basing the Polish defense system on our own resources does not mean that it should be isolated from those countries which, in the event that a crisis situation arises, can provide effective assistance. The availability of our own efficiently functioning defense system will bring Poland closer to Western defense structures and accelerate good cooperation—in defense, too—with our neighbors. For this reason, too, the Polish defense system should be unequivocally viewed and evaluated on the international political scene by those who are currently shaping present and future security in Europe and the world. It should also be extremely real and clear to the entire nation and assure a rational and

committed inclusion of the nation in translating it into reality.

If national defense is to be credible, it must include not just the Armed Forces but the entire nation. The enemy should reckon that superbly prepared command and staff cadres and trained troops, as well as a resolute stance on defense by the entire society, mean that victory will not be easy.

The credibility and efficiency of the national defense system also largely depend on the efficiency of transition from time of peace to time of war. That also is why assuring a high combat and mobilizational readiness of the Armed Forces and a reliable functioning of the system for governing the country and commanding the Armed Forces should be priority objectives. A credible national defense system fulfills a highly important domestic objective, namely, it effectively averts and counteracts the rise of crisis situations and threats other than military ones.

When preparing the defense system and doing the related calculations and assessments, it should be borne in mind that a weak partner is ignored. A weak national defense is also a natural incentive for multifaceted domination by a neighboring country.

In view of this, the Polish national defense system must be universal, with its strength based on the psychological and defense-oriented preparation of the entire society. Hence also, in addition to the Armed Forces, other elements of the organizational structures of the state, assuring their efficient operation in periods of threats and major crisis situations, should be prepared.

But the fundamental prerequisite for the national security of the Republic of Poland, for its national defense, is a farsighted, activist, and realistically pursued foreign and domestic policy, especially as regards the development of good-neighbor relations with adjoining countries, as well as with those which, in the event of a crisis situation, may provide economic and military assistance, help spur the growth of the economy, science, and technology, and help preserve indispensable self-sufficiency in defense.

While politics is the paramount influencing factor, the other elements of the national defense system are the following potentials:

—economic, including that of the defense industry;

—defense, i.e., the Armed Forces;

—human and material resources;

—in-depth territorial, i.e., the forces and resources of the home guard and civil defense;

—eventual assistance by allied countries, which can be utilized in a crisis situation.

The above potentials are not constant. They are subject to continuous reappraisals and changes, because they are directly and indirectly influenced by various factors, and in particular by foreign and domestic threats.

For a defense system to be solid and efficient, different objectives have to be assigned to each of its elements. These objectives are mandatory and must be accomplished both in peacetime and in time of a threat to national security and eventual armed conflict.

As noted above, the Armed Forces, and especially their combat potential, play the cardinal role in the defense system. The elements of that potential serve as the basis for defining and shaping the effectiveness with which crisis situations are averted and counteracted, and eventual armed aggression by an enemy repelled. The principal elements of the combat potential of the Armed Forces are as follows:

1. Political and Economic Factors:

—industrial potential and the possibilities for its conversion;

—defense services that can be provided by civilian sectors;

—eventual assistance by allied countries.

2. Military Factors:

—intellectual and professional preparedness of commanders, staff officers, and military experts;

—size of the Armed Forces;

—tactical, combat, and specialist training of troops;

—level and modernity of the weaponry and equipment of the Armed Forces;

—efficiency of the command and intelligence system;

—maintaining troops in high combat and mobilizational readiness;

—efficiency of the mobilizational system and operational deployment;

—preparation of human and material reserves;

—budget of the Defense Ministry;

—system of governance of the state and its relationship to the troop command system.

A major role in developing the internal organizational structure of elements of the defense potential is the

evaluation of the factors decisive to the further growth and elaboration of these elements.

Evaluation of various threats, both present-day ones and those which may arise in the short and long run, prompts assigning great importance, in buttressing the defense potential of the Armed Forces, to the following elements:

—intelligence;

—level of training of operational troop units and home guard;

—provision of the Armed Forces with new weaponry and equipment;

—an efficient command system;

—an efficient logistical system;

—cooperation and exchange of experience with other armies in Europe and the world;

—development and refinement of military training, especially of the training of command and staff cadres.

When considering and evaluating factors affecting the quality of the defense (combat) potential of the Armed Forces, that potential should, at the same time, be continually tracked so as to prevent its lowering. The principal adverse factors include inappropriate strategic, operational, and tactical concepts and premises; lowering of the level of training of command and staff cadres and of the combat and mobilizational readiness of troops; and lowering of the level of the tactical, combat, and operational training of military units. A major effect on all elements of the potential is produced by lowering the level of military and social discipline as well as discipline of execution, and also by any lowering of patriotism and morale.

Other elements adverse to combat potential include technological backwardness of weaponry and equipment, a faulty organizational structure of the Armed Forces, obsolete reconnaissance and command systems, and the dependence of weaponry and equipment on foreign shipments.

At present, any army that wants to be a modern one is becoming increasingly dependent on economic and scientific-technical potential. In this connection, allowance should be made for the continuing and even growing reassessment of the role and objectives of the armed forces, especially in the economically strong countries.

Special caution, finesse, astuteness, and political circumspection are needed for an economically weak country to oppose the expansive economic strategy of an economically strong one. In such a situation, the role of an efficient national defense system, inclusive of the armed forces, will consist in averting the accomplishment of political objectives by means of economic "aggression" and assuring the possibility of opposing armed aggression in support of economic expansion.

In creating and perfecting a defense system, allowance also should be made for the activities of national minorities, for their political and economic links to their countries of origin (A. Madejski, J. Stepak, "Causes of Military Threats," MYSL WOJSKOWA, pp 5-10, No. 5, 1994.) Not without importance also is the renascence of nationalist movements, which receive, most often unofficially, the support, especially economic, of their governments as well as assistance from various social organizations.

Of course, the ideas presented above merely signal the problem, for they require more extensive research and broader motivation. But aside from this, the selected aspects of the national defense system considered here represent an introduction to further and more detailed studies.

Poland: Minister Worried About Growing Trade Deficit

LD2703122496 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1105 GMT 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Minister of Foreign Economic Cooperation Jacek Buchacz is worried by the growing foreign trade deficit. In his opinion, it is mostly excessive appreciation—in other words the increase in the value of the zloty against Western currencies—that is impacting on this.

[Correspondent Marek Kassa] Minister Jacek Buchacz agrees that inflation has to be combated, but, in his view, this cannot slow the economic development of the state. Meanwhile, despite the fact that foreign trade turnover exceeded $52 billion last year, imports rose much faster than exports. The deficit for last year will come to approximately $6 billion dollars, and this year it might be even greater because importers are to get additional privileges and exports are becoming increasingly less profitable. Minister Buchacz thinks that assistance to exporters in the form of credits and guarantees has to be boosted, that the hitherto investment relief has to be maintained, and that the promotion of our economy abroad has to be improved. We must also prepare carefully for the fact that economic growth in the European Union, particularly in Germany, is diminishing and that it will become increasingly difficult to export to this area. Minister Buchacz said that Poland would try to find new sales markets in Asia and Africa and would

try to make better use of its position between East and West. This is Marek Kassa speaking from the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation.

Poland: Malaysia Reportedly May Barter Cars for Polish Tanks

WS2603134096 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 26 Mar 96 p 3

[Article by "QUB, PW": "Poland, Slovakia, and England Vie for Contract With Malaysia; Tanks for Protons?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *Will we receive Malaysian Proton automobiles [in exchange] for Polish tanks? Information on such proposals appeared during Prime Minister Cimoszewicz's visit to Malaysia. Officials remain silent.*

"The subject of a contract to deliver tanks to Malaysia did come up in the talks, but no specifics were discussed," conceded Andrzej Wasilewski of the Office of the Council of Ministers, who accompanied the prime minister during his visit. He immediately added, however, that arms transactions are secret.

In line with unofficial information, Malaysia is soon going to spend up to $10 billion to buy equipment for its Armed Forces, consisting of 85,000 soldiers. The top priority is the purchase of armored units, which Malaysia practically does not have. According to the Malyasian National Defense Ministry, the military will want to buy up to 300 tanks. The countries that are vying for the contract of the century with Malaysia are Slovakia, Great Britain, and Poland.

A Tie-In Transaction

According to our information, last year the Malaysians checked at least twice to see if there was a possibility for them to sell their automobiles in return for our tanks. Right now the price of cars made in Asia and sold in Poland includes a 35-percent tariff.

Last fall, Malaysian Defense Minister Albar Datuk Syed Hamid bin Syed visited the Bumar-Labedy Company. He was primarily interested in the capabilities of Twardy, the Polish version of the T-72 tank, which is popular in East Asia. In December, former Defense Minister Okonski extolled the merits of Twardy at the "Lima 1995" arms exhibition, which took place on Langkwi Island. At that time, there appeared rumors that the Malaysians were interested primarily in barter.

Unofficial information that Malaysia would pay with automobiles for Polish tanks reappeared last week, as Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz was visiting Southeast Asia.

"I did not hear this during the visit; in addition, the details of a possible contract would be handled by Cenzin [a state-owned arms-trading company]," said Bumar-Labedy Board Chairman Henryk Pfeiffer, who accompanied the prime minister on his Asian trip, commenting on information that was reported by Polish TV. He admitted, however, that the factory is interested in selling its tanks to Malaysia. "We look upon this country as a potential customer."

The Bumar-Labedy director announced that representatives of the company would go to Malaysia once again in April to take part in another exhibition of military equipment. [passage omitted]

Romania: PLO Envoy Sees No Danger of Hamas Attacks

AU2603210396 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 21 Mar 96 p 17

[Interview with Fu'ad al-Bitar, ambassador of the Palestinian Authority to Bucharest, by an unidentified reporter; place and date not given: "Hamas Has No Means for a Terrorist Attack in Romania"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [JURNALUL NATIONAL] Excellency, allow me to ask you a direct question. Who do you think is responsible for the damage done to the peace process between Israel and the Palestinian state?

[Al-Bitar] I would say that terrorists are respnsible for that. But terrorists can be found on both sides. They do not want the peace process to make any progress. It is difficult to say who started it all because the conflict between us has lasted for a long time. One thing is certain: The terrorists have not received and will not receive any support from the Palestinian Authority. Therefore, we are investing maximum effort in the struggle against the terrorists.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] What was Hamas's role in the terrorist attacks?

[Al-Bitar] Hamas admitted that it was behind the attacks in Israel—Ashkelon, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv. These attempts, which damaged the peace process, bear Hamas's signature.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] What does Hamas actually want?

[Al-Bitar] Hamas wants to stop the peace process. They believe that they are acting only against the Israelis by organizing their attempts. As a matter of fact, they are also acting against the Palestinians, because we, together with the Israelis, want to build peace.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] How many members does Hamas have?

[Al-Bitar] I do not know their exact number but I believe it is a large organization. Hamas members have always concentrated their efforts on the youth and the younger generation, which they hope to corrupt with their fanatic ideas. It is easier for them to implement their ideas with the young and make them commit suicide by promising them that they will go to heaven. That is exactly what they think. From a certain age on (20-21 years), they begin talking about life and death. For them, death is considered a privilege because they go to heaven.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] Is Mr. 'Arafat satisfied with the coercive measures taken against the terrorists?

[Al-Bitar] In a way, yes. There were many arrests. It is, however, hard to catch all of them. You need time to find out who the Hamas leaders are. They are in many places; they have many branches all over the place. Therefore, you cannot hit them all at once. Until now, I think that we have done pretty well. We arrested Hamas cadres and militants, but not enough of them. If we caught the heads of this organization, then Hamas would be weakened. An erroneous path has also been chosen, in that the Israelis thought that if they destroy the houses of the terrorists in the West Bank and Gaza, everything would be fine. Well, that was a wrong move because, as in the case of the Hamas "engineer," the terrorists were not intimidated. All the Palestinians, not only Hamas, might think of revenge. The relatives of those killed or arrested, and even their friends, feel hurt and begin to sympathize with Hamas, out of a desire for revenge.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] Who is the Hamas leader?

[Al-Bitar] His name is kept secret by the organization members. There are many leaders.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] I put this question to you because the Peres government wanted the head of the Hamas leader in return for calling off the restrictions in the West Bank and Gaza.

[Al-Bitar] Yes, but we are talking only about one of the leaders. We are doing everything possible to bring the terrorists to court. We must defend ourselves and the peace process.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] Your Excellency, the Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI] said that Hamas is one of the organizations acting on Romania's territory and preparing certain actions. What do you think about that? It seems that Hamas members are covertly studying here in various universities.

[Al-Bitar] You see, the SRI knows better than me or you about the size of the Hamas nucleus operating in Romania. Your country's security depends on the SRI. But I do not believe that there is a Hamas organization here. There are a few students trying to recruit other students. I do not think there is more than that. Moreover, I do not think that they are really interested in carrying out terrorist attacks in Romania. They do not have the means for that, and the interest is low.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] Therefore, you do not think that Hamas can be a danger for us?

[Al-Bitar] I do not think so, but it is the SRI's duty to check the danger levels in this respect. You must act in your own way.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] Do you not think that the security measures taken by the Palestinian state and Israel against the terrorists will drive them to targets outside the region? Since they are under strict supervision there, might they not start a wave of attacks throughout the world, all of them bearing the Hamas signature?

[Al-Bitar] No, I do not think so. First of all, they do not have the means to operate outside Palestine and Israel. We are not talking only about transferring cadres and militants, but also the arms they need for their operations. On the other hand, freedom of movement in the world is very restricted. Although they have ways and means to cooperate with militants from other countries, these means are very limited and weak. Hamas does not have the scope of a national liberation movement or a popular movement. Nor is Hamas as big as it claims in Palestine itself. It does not represent 20 percent of the population of the West Bank and 30 percent of Gaza. Actually, it fails by far in that respect. Of course, it has its sympathizers, but there is a big step from sympathizer to full Hamas member.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] Where does Hamas's financing come from, in your opinion?

[Al-Bitar] As President Yasir 'Arafat said, the Palestinian Authority has important documents attesting to the involvement of Iran and other Arab states from the Gulf. It is up to Mr. 'Arafat to choose the right moment for disclosing these documents.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] Your Excellency, what is the assistance granted by the Bucharest authorities in the promotion of the peace process?

[Al-Bitar] This help is enormous. However, I would like to mention, as I said on other occasions, too, the huge assistance granted to us by the former president Nicolae Ceausescu. As a matter of fact, Ceausescu was the first one who helped start off this whole peace process. Ceausescu was the man who managed to bring the PLO and Israel to the same negotiating table. I would go so far as to say that without Ceausescu we would not have been today in this advanced stage. He kept secretly calling representatives of the two sides to Mangalia and Constanta, where negotiations were conducted on this topic.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] Your Excellency, this seems to me quite incredible, but then His Excellency Mr. Avshalom Meggidon, Israel's ambassador to Bucharest, said the same thing.

[Al-Bitar] Well, this is the truth. I would like to emphasize once more Ceausescu's huge merit in this respect. Even now, your country's assistance is quite large. I would like to take this opportunity to again thank President Ion Iliescu for the efforts made to help Palestine and Israel. The Crans Montana Forum held in Bucharest was of great help to us.

Romania: Government Hopes To Sign 4 Treaties by Elections

AU2503135496 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 19 Mar 96 p 7

[MEDIAFAX report: "Treaties With Russia, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, and Hungary Will Be Signed Before the General Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Romania hopes to sign all four basic treaties that are being negotiated with the Russian Federation, the Republic of Moldova, Hungary, and Ukraine by the next general elections, said Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu. "We want to sign them during the current mandate because we cannot assume obligations for future governments," Melescanu stated. Sources of the Senate's Foreign Policy Commission said that Romania hopes to sign the political treaty with Russia before the 16 June presidential elections in that country because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not very optimistic about the results.

In turn, President Ion Iliescu said that the political treaty with Ukraine could be signed before the Russian-Romanian treaty. The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the treaties with Hungary, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine are very close to being finalized, while the treaty with the Republic of Moldova is in its initial stage.

Romania: Hungarian Senators Refer Party Law to Court

LD2603174096 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1500 GMT 26 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania [UDMR] has turned to the Constitutional Court over the new Romanian party law. Tibor Bogdan reports from Bucharest:

[Bogdan] According to the UDMR's group of senators, the fact that the party law obliges political parties to serve the country's national sovereignty, territorial integrity, legal system, and the principles of democracy—although the constitution requires only the observation [tiszteletben tartas] of it—is the violation of the constitution. The article, which stipulates that at least 10,000 founding members from 15 counties with at least 300 people from each county are required to form a party, violates the principles of the freedom of assembly and political pluralism laid down in the constitution. And

what is more, the party law extends this requirement, with a retrospective effect, to the currently existing parties that have already been legally registered.

In addition to the UDMR, the appeal has been signed by several senators of the Christian Democratic National Peasants' Party, the Civic Alliance Party, and the liberal group.

Romania: Verdet Says PDSR Seeks To Dismiss PSM Prefects

AU2503143596 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 19 Mar 96 p 7

[Article by Mirela Soare: "For the PSM, It Seems Clear That the Socialist Prefects Represent the Real Issue"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although the protocol between the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] and the PSM [Socialist Party of Labor] has not functioned for quite some time, the meeting on 14 March between the presidents of the two political formations, Oliviu Gherman and Ilie Verdet, respectively, clarified the situation; the protocol was officially broken.

Verdet stated yesterday that he is dissatisfied with the PDSR leader's answers to the question: "Why is the state apparatus made up of one party's representative?" Verdet reminded Gherman that the presence of the two PSM prefects was not part of the protocol and added that if the PDSR is going to dismiss or replace them, it will be for political reasons. Ilie Verdet draws the ruling party's attention to the fact that if it is going to act against the two prefects, the PDSR and the PSM will no longer cooperate in the local arena.

Slovenia: Parliament Interrupts Foreign Policy Debate

AU2703091696 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1800 GMT 26 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] About ten minutes ago State Chamber Speaker Jozef Skoljc interrupted the extraordinary session of parliament at the proposal of the Social Democratic bench. The deputies had been discussing certain foreign policy issues, primarily our foreign policy guidelines and harmonization with the EU, the whole day. In this connection special attention was paid to relations with Italy. Foreign Minister Thaler and Prime Minister Drnovsek also intervened in the rather polemical debate. Igor Juric reports:

[Begin recording] In his speeches in the afternoon Zoran Thaler primarily explained the Spanish proposal to the deputies. He assured them that he did not want personally to hurt anyone with his introductory address. He explained that he had deliberately chosen the order in which he discussed matters in his introductory speech. He also explained that approval of the government platform and the Slovene foreign policy guidelines would help a lot toward ensuring that Slovene views are clear and readily recognizable, on the basis of which Slovene foreign policy could then act.

During the debate the deputies were also addressed by Prime Minister Drnovsek. According to him, at the beginning of their journey as an independent state the Slovenes very quickly took some steps into Europe and were unanimous in this. The second step now should be associate membership agreement with the EU, and the third step full membership. In our subsequent steps toward the EU we encountered Italy and its demands, which took us by surprise. It transpired that the EU is not an ideal place and that it has its problems, too.

The prime minister repeated some known facts about the conflict with Italy and added that, objectively speaking, Slovenia had not suffered any damage as a result. On the contrary, we made use of the conflict with our western neighbor to present our country as a successful candidate for EU entry, which they also acknowledge to us abroad. To get into the Union, we will have to harmonize our legislation with European legislation. If this does not happen the Italians will find it ever easier to play their trump card, namely, that Slovenia is not willing to accept the rules of the game in the EU. Yesterday's statement by the Italian representative in Brussels implies this.

The prime minister urged the deputies to adopt the papers prepared by the government as they propose that Slovenia clearly opts for the EU and also accepts the Spanish proposal and the harmonization of our legislation with European legislation. Namely, the European summit in Madrid clearly concluded its debate on Slovenia with the conclusion that our country would sign the associate membership agreement with the EU during the Italian presidency on the basis of the Spanish proposal. If Italy does not cease hindering Slovenia afterward, the government will, according to Drnovsek, propose that Slovenia files a request for full membership in the EU. [end recording]

Slovenia: MP's Attack FM Thaler's Policy Address

AU2603163096 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 26 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] At today's extraordinary session the parliament is debating Slovene foreign policy and the views and the conclusions regarding our relations with Italy and the European Union. In the introduction, the deputies were addressed by Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler. The members of Lojze Peterle's coalition Christian Democratic Party (SKD) took a negative stance toward his address. Nadja Pengov reports:

[Begin recording] Foreign Minister Thaler believes it is the platform on relations with the European Union and Italy that is controversial rather than the foreign policy guidelines. He expects that the decision on this will be passed without pouring mud on the government and the supposedly incompetent ministry, whose minister should be replaced because the foreign policy was botched. The European reality, he said, requires harmonization of the property legislation. The Italian demands are not a part of it. He finds it unacceptable that apart from the SKD, which leaned on the wrong side, and to an extent the Liberal Democracy, there was not a single political party that would accept reality, namely, that the constitution must be changed because otherwise Slovenia would remain outside Europe. In doing so, the foreign minister said, they would be safe in the eyes of the public and the government would take the blame.

Why problems with Brussels and Italy? Instead of looking at Brussels we saw in every move the means of disarming Italy. The promise of Europe has turned into a nuisance and we lost our bearings.

The proposed platform and conclusions that the government compiled for adoption in the parliament in the form identical to the one that the parliamentary [foreign affairs] committee had passed and forwarded for adoption, in Thaler's opinion contains numerous shortcomings.

The reactions were momentous. Marjan Podobnik, Slovene People's Party: Thaler was aggressive, insulting, and coarse. Foreign policy must proceed from a

sovereign, national state. Democrat Tone Persak: The desire for success prior to the elections should not be the reason for political moves that we may regret later. Igor Bavcar, Liberal Democracy: Membership in the Union is a priority; there is no other one. This is not all about the success of the government but about the success of the state. Lojze Peterle, SDK: We assume no coalition responsibility for the speech by the foreign minister. The address was disrespectful toward the parliament and brimming with lies, accusations, and self-defense. Joze Pucnik, Social Democratic Party: The minister's speech demonstrates his lack of understanding of the party system. Pucnik also expects that the prime minister will decide and make a move as he would otherwise assume the full responsibility for the failed foreign policy. [end recording]

Slovenia: Commentator on FM's 'Tactless' Policy Address

AU2703094596 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 0600 GMT 27 Mar 99

[Commentary by Nadja Pengov—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] If we understand it correctly, the representatives of the government—specifically the foreign minister [Zoran Thaler] and, after him, the prime minister [Janez Drnovsek]—came to parliament yesterday primarily to win the go-ahead for further negotiations with Brussels. They see this go-ahead signal in a document entitled the Platform and Conclusions on Slovenia, EU, and Italy. The snag is, however, that the deputies received for adoption an amended version of the proposal that was adopted by the parliamentary commission for international relations, while the government believes that this go-ahead can only be won with the adoption of a document with an identical title that the government itself forwarded to parliament. Therefore, it is not clear what sort of conclusions the deputies will adopt today.

Then there is another catch. The government representative, Foreign Minister Thaler, came to parliament yesterday to win consensus. With his introductory address, however, he raised reporters' eyebrows, while causing indignation among the deputies whom he was supposed to win over. The indignation was undivided among the deputies of all parliamentary parties, with the exception of the Liberal Democracy and the representative of the Italian minority. The minister's address, namely, had nothing to do with diplomacy, and surprisingly also nothing to do with the creation of a constructive atmosphere among the deputies, who were not exactly enraptured with him and his conduct of diplomacy to start with and who, let us recall, had earlier filed a request for a parliamentary debate of no confidence in his work. For that reason a good two-thirds of the session resembled a debate more on the minister's competence than any sort of decisionmaking on the above documents.

Of course, we do not know why the minister opted for such a performance. There are two possibilities. It is possible that he judged he could afford this tactless move knowing full well that the no-confidence vote in him would succeed, or on the contrary, it is possible that he lost his nerve knowing that he would remain in the post after the no-confidence vote.

Slovenia: France Confirms Support in Dispute With Italy

AU2503142196 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 16 Mar 96 p 1

[Article by Bozo Masanovic: "France Supports Us in the Italian-Slovene Dispute"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Paris, 15 March—At the end of his three day visit to the French capital, Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek met with the top French politicians (except with head of state Jacques Chirac). He also submitted Slovenia's request for full membership in the OECD at the headquarters of this organization. Drnovsek said that his talks were successful and most useful. In the evening he met with French Prime Minister Alain Juppe.

Drnovsek said that France's position regarding EU membership is clear: France supports Slovenia's endeavors for EU membership. Thanks to our economic success, France places us within the first group of candidates, although we have not yet signed the association treaty with the EU. This has not been done because of the Italian blockade. French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette confirmed to Drnovsek that France supports Slovenia in its dispute with Italy, as the Rome veto is of a purely political nature. France can help solve the Italian-Slovene dispute, which is what the French Minister for European Matters and main negotiator Michel Barnier will attempt to accomplish at the forthcoming intergovernmental EU conference on institutional reform. However, France cannot outvote Italy. In a number of interviews that he gave for the French media, the Slovene Prime Minister explained Ljubljana's position regarding the dispute with its neighbor. This is probably an useful transitional move, until the Italian parliamentary elections clarify their political situation.

[Box, p 1]

The negotiations for Slovenia's admission to the EU can begin as soon as the conditions are met, therefore after the IGC [Inter-Governmental Conference] on institutional reform, said Prime Minister Juppe, after his talks

with Prime Minister Drnovsek this evening. Juppe arrived from Normandy in order to receive the guest from Ljubljana. When questioned whether the signing of the associative membership is a necessary step in the integrational process, he gave a short answer: "If it is possible to attain." According to the Matignon [as published] the dispute between Italy and Slovenia should finally be solved, and that by talks on the bilateral level. France is ready to help straighten out the differences. Nevertheless, the opinion in Paris is that Slovenia is "well prepared" for integration and is among the "more qualitative candidates." It was heard from unofficial sources that, in the end, Slovenia could join the EU directly without an earlier signing of the association treaty.

Slovenia: Intelligence Chief Views Foreign Activity

AU2603210196 Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene 22 Mar 96 p 3

[Report by Alenka Brezovnik: "Tentacles of Foreign Informers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There is nothing new in some people boasting that they received more information from foreign intelligence services than from their own, although the question of quality also arises here. This situation is one of Slovenia's weak points and comes as a result of a different understanding of the intelligence security system. The consequence of this is a dissonant and disjointed appearance on the foreign markets, a poor exchange of information, and a partiality of interests, which all have negative consequences for Slovenia.

Drago Fers, director of SOVA, the Slovene Security-Intelligence Agency, who pointed out this problem to the businessmen of the Socius Club at their meeting yesterday, is convinced that SOVA operates with quality information, but that it does not receive enough demands for concrete cooperation in the economic sphere, which could assist in concrete decision making. SOVA is, therefore, no longer exclusively a protection system but is introducing new categories, including an option for a company that feels threatened in its contacts abroad to request expert assistance.

World Is Waging a Trade War

The activity of foreign intelligence services after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the eastern regimes did not decline, but rather its weight shifted from the political and the military sphere to the economy. The world is now in an era of new trade wars in which the economic strength of individual states is decisive and the competition is driving companies into acquiring as much information as possible about their competitors. Slovenia is no exception, and the work of the foreign agencies is geared to acquiring information on the safety of foreign investments and their protection. The most important thing here is the credit reports on economic partners. "The worst possible option would be if others decided the fate of Slovenia. To prevent this from happening, we need a coordinated action at the state and business level parallel to an adequate intelligence-security activity. This does not mean isolation from abroad, as opening to the outside world is a part of the state strategy. However, we must know the details and know what interests foreign countries, what is their interest, and what sort of measures they plan," Fers said. In this way, Slovenia would be able to safeguard its sovereignty. SOVA's activity in the economic sphere is geared to collecting, documenting, and analyzing occurences that are harmful to Slovene economic interests. The other elements fall under the authority of other services, ranging from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Crime Department, the Office for the Prevention of Money Laundering, the Accounting Court, and so on. SOVA must show all its results to the relevant authorities because it does not have any executive powers in itself. For example, the assessment of models of property transformation of companies with consequences that are harmful to our economic system, which is not under its authority.

"After 1991 we did not detect any direct attempts to undermine our economic foundations but rather to transfer capital. Foreign services are interested in obtaining economic data to achieve an advantage over foreign competition. To a lesser degree, individual companies (Siemens, Renault, Creditanstalt) also dabble in intelligence activity. The interest in companies with military production, for example Iskra Teleoptika, TAM, and the iron works, is great. After the disbanding of the former counterintelligence protection of firms, a wide gap has opened that foreigners use for technical espionage and attempts to destroy some industrial branches," Fers emphasized.

Thwarted Computer Plan

Regarding the succession of the former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], the interests of all intelligence agencies are the same, especially of those countries that hold our assets and are trying to use them to repair the consequences of the war in the Balkans. The case of TAM is still titillating the public. They are also gathering intensely information on economic crime and, in return for cooperation, offer financial assistance for debt repayment to the individuals involved. To obtain information, they use a very specific questionnaire, involve the diplomatic and consular missions, and forward data to the institutes in Germany, where these are being processed further. They also tried to obtain qual-

ity data on the economic system within the framework of the management school in Brdo near Kranj. SOVA thwarted a computer plan in due time.

As Fers said, the Austrians display great interest in the Krsko nuclear power plant not only because of the possibility of radiation and a shutdown, but also because they are interested in our internal affairs. They are collecting information on Koper harbor, construction of the Slovene highways, and the Ravne iron works, and they are also checking out credit reports for some companies, in which Creditanstalt is particularly active. They would like to reach Bosnia through us, and they are interested in protecting their own capital and themselves from Arabic intelligence services.

Italy is under the strong influence of extreme right forces. The Italian intelligence service SIS [Intelligence and Security Service] is distinctly adversely disposed toward Slovenia, and the Carst caves and the foot-dragging in construction of the highway are no coincidence. One of the Italian objectives is to penetrate into the Balkans, and their main attention is focused on the former occupied territories. The Italians are linking themselves powerfully with the FRY and are already planning joint actions, while the information about Carst caves originates from Belgrade. They are present in the Slovene casinos and are trying to influence the outcome. Across the border (Trieste, Gorizia) the interests of Italy, FRY, and the Orthodox Church are interwoven with the interests of the intelligence services, the PKB bank in Trieste, and Safti. They are all undermining the economic strength of the Slovene minority, that is, its activities. Various firms have been formed (Siemens purchased Fines with 1,800 billion liras of capital). The latter purchased brandy distilleries in the Czech Republic, then linked them up and destroyed them, and it also wanted to purchase Videm Krsko.

French Propose Black List

Great Britain became greatly involved in the monitoring of our foreign currency deposits, it passed the information on, and it is also showing interest for greater economic cooperation. They do not have a bad opinion about the situation in Slovenia, however, they have poor information. The French show their interest in our economy via Cimos, Renault, and Citroen. Even before independence, articles were systematically translated in Renault and forwarded to France by which they tried to protect their market in this part of Europe. Revoz yielded for tactical reasons, however, it did not abandon its goals. Because of their traditional friendship with the Serbs, the French are engaged in the succession of the foreign currency assets. They are proposing to various governments that Slovenia be placed on a black list.

Taiwan's intelligence service, which seeks ways to acquire capital because many do not recognize this country, is also active. SOVA detected the Croatian presence in the Krsko nuclear power plant as well as the incitement of the passions of the Croatian depositors at the Ljubljanska Banka Zagreb branch. The Croatian lobby in Hungary (the road links) is especially powerful. Also active in the economic sphere is the intelligence service of FRY, which would like to obtain the names of directors who are willing to illegally accept money of dubious origin, and the Yugoslav Army's intelligence service is also involved in some activities. Similar interests and activities by Bosnia-Herzegovina were also ascertained. Despite everything stated above, Fers emphasizes that the Slovene economy is not sufficiently threatened to sound the alarm bell. Everything is reflected in relations with economic partners.

Federal

FRY: Article Sees U.S. Influence Over Hague Tribunal

AU2603204196 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 21 Mar 96 p 3

[Article by I. Lovric: "To Whom Does the Hague Tribunal Belong?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Is the International Tribunal in The Hague a legal or a political institution? Judging by the statement issued by Mate Granic, the Croatian foreign minister, this dilemma has been removed: The Hague Tribunal is much more "fond" of politicians than of law paragraphs. When he heard that General Tihomir Blaskic, a war crimes suspect, would voluntarily appear in The Hague, the Croatian foreign minister said that the United States of America had accepted that "Blaskic would receive 'special treatment!'"

This deal between the United States and Croatia is at least surprising as the Hague Tribunal is under the patronage of the United Nations, and not "Uncle Sam." If the judges really respect their independence, as they claim, any U.S. involvement in the trials should be excluded.

Agreements about the treatment of the accused are possible, but without influence from any side. According to the Anglo-Saxon legal system, this court is allowed to decide how to treat the accused. This is, however, an exclusive right of Goldstone, for example, not of Christopher. With every respect for the court, there is also a moral problem: How is it possible that a young Croatian general, if he even comes to The Hague, is offered a hotel accommodation, and the old Serbian General Djukic, confirmed by the Dutch medical care system as suffering from cancer, ends up in a prison cell? If we return to Granic's statement about the agreement that has been achieved with the United States, the question must be raised what it would be like, for example, if Russia demanded special treatment for General Djukic. We do not think that the answer to that request would be positive. It has proven to be true that the highly regarded Belgrade attorney Toma Fila is right because he has been claiming from the very beginning that the Hague Tribunal is in fact a U.S. court financed by U.S.-Muslim capital.

FRY: Tribunal Resumes Hearings on Former Army Officers

AU2603190796 Paris AFP in English 1825 GMT 26 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Hague, March 26 (AFP)—The International Criminal Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia resumed hearings on Tuesday in the case of three ex-Yugoslav army officers accused of ordering the death of 261 hospital patients.

The three officers, Colonel Mile Mrksic, 48, Captain Miroslav Radic, 35, and Major Veselin Sljivancanin, 42, are accused by the UN tribunal of being behind the November 1991 massacre of 261 non-Serb patients who were dragged from their hospital beds in the eastern Croatian town of Vukovar and murdered.

The hearings in the case began last Wednesday with testimony by experts who explained to the court, with the aid of video footage, the historical context of the Yugoslav crisis and then recalled the Yugoslav army's attack on Vukovar.

The trio, who are still at large, cannot yet be tried by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia here because its legal rules, based on Anglo-Saxon law, do not allow trials in absentia.

The hearings should allow the court to decide on whether to issue an international arrest warrant against the three.

Serbia

Serbia: Commentary Terms United States World's 'Bully'

AU2603173796 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 23-24 Mar 96 p 2

[Commentary by Nikola Burzan: "An American Oxymoron"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is said: "Never say never!" But I have to say that I have never been to the United States (unfortunately), and you can imagine how inferior I feel in front of those who boast of having been there 60 or even 70 times! I know the United States only from movies, reports, books, and the stories told by those lucky people who have visited it. I am particularly fond of the book written by the most celebrated of all the world's "fierce reporters," (Egon Erwin Kisch), namely "American Eden." I peruse it all the time and think: Why did God give me, an innocent wretch, the destiny of Cain, to be banned east of Eden?

And so, since I (unfortunately) have not had an opportunity to taste the American way of life, in particular its democracy, I cannot judge it from the outside. The foreign U.S. democracy is, however, a matter with which I am more familiar, and the more I sense it, the more often a strange thought comes into my mind: This is, in fact, a dictatorship of democracy!

Do you know how this figure of speech is called? It is called oxymoron! And Vujaklija [not further specified]

explains it like this: A funny nonsensical thought that, on first sight, contains a contradiction, yet both ideas stand one beside the other and link up into a single idea, for instance, mute voice, smart fool, honest thief, eloquent silence, etc.

As I have invented a nonsensical thought, I am obliged to explain this American oxymoron of mine. The simplest and probably the only logical explanation would be: The United States has no longer an equal on this planet, it is the only world superpower, and its logic of being a superpower has not been as blatant as it is today since the times of Genghis Khan. It has been demonstrated in our region as vividly as is usual in schools, particularly in resolving the (unresolvable) Bosnian knot. As for the rest of the world, let us forget about it for now.

You will say: The guy is again overdoing the irony. However, this is an irony of fate! What was the Dayton accord? A U.S. dictate. What the Balkan warriors did not accept willingly, they were forced to accept. Even though everybody, and the bully himself, knew that the agreement was full of oxymoron contradictions and deficiencies. Particularly in its civilian section. Unfortunately, the situation on the ground has confirmed this convincingly.

All right: Even the worst peace is better than the best war (particularly if you are losing it). Once it starts, however, the avalanche is difficult to halt. It destroys and carries with itself everything that lies in its path—friends and enemies, the innocent and the guilty—without choosing either methods or means to reach the goal it has set itself and forced on others. Even though everybody understands that the aim—to pacify Bosnia and arrange it as a multinational community, and all this just within one year's time—is practically (and realistically) unfeasible.

Force may take away lands or cities, but it will not settle the question of Bosnia. Force is blind, so it cannot see (or does not want to see) what is obvious. It wants a multinational Bosnia, and it does not see (or does not want to see) that the Muslims in Sarajevo have, as a matter of fact, banned Serbs or Croats from the city authorities. Sarajevo did suffer, it was being shelled, tortured, and killed, but who will be to blame for its suicide?

It is clear to me that Pale and Karadzic are to blame. But "Daytonization" is supposed to mean disarmament as well, that is, the reduction of arms in Bosnia (and not only there). The Americans, however, want to arm it at any price! At the Ankara conference, which was hastily and forcefully called, the Americans experienced a real fiasco: To their $100 millions (and it is said that more than $800 million is needed) only the Turks added their $2 million, and nobody else added a cent more!

I am not rediscovering America, for all the Western and even U.S. press is reporting on that. With their oxymoron policy, the Americans have already caused conflicts not only with the Russians and the Chinese, but also with their Western allies, and primarily the Europeans. True, fractures in the Western alliance appeared before Dayton, but Ankara was the first public post-Dayton slap in the Americans' face by Europe.

I admit that I was surprised and revolted to see Europe's wavering and inefficiency in dealing with the Yugoslav crisis and that I supported the U.S. resolve, which I still do. But one must to have balance in everything: Europe wants to rebuild Bosnia, whereas the Americans want to arm it at the expense of others! "The idea is mine, gasoline is yours," Ostap Bender said once.

Is it the U.S. domestic (electoral) democracy that is driving Washington to apply a foreign dictatorship of democracy? Washington does whatever it wants, without consulting anybody. The recent summit in Rome was hastily called by the Americans, and even the host, Italy, was informed about it only 48 hours in advance! What more is to be said on the most recent Geneva conference? Just several days before the ministerial conference in Moscow, which was arranged long time in advance, Washington invites the Balkan leaders to arrange a meeting of their ministers! Do Clinton and Christopher switch on the vacuum cleaner for their maids?

The Russians (unfortunately?) are no longer a superpower, but they are not a piece of cake either, and they are rightfully angry, insulted, and hurt because of the behavior of their partner for peace. Are the Americans taking on the role of God, creating the world (a new world order) in their own image?

You will probably say that I was a moron, rather than an oxymoron, for not visiting the United States and tasting its democracy. From inside, of course. Perhaps. But if it is like the external image.... I better stay here, to spare myself from disappointment and to keep Kisch's "American Eden" in my memory. Even if I am wrong, my consolation is that even bigger and greater ones make mistakes: For instance, on the list of the 100 most influential women in the world that THE TIMES of London composed, Mira Markovic is placed 31st. In my (oxy)moronic opinion, she should have been placed among the first 10. Or even five.... Out of pure spite to Hillary....

Serbia: SPO Denounces Milosevic in Contact Group Letter

AU2603184496 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 26 Mar 96 p 9

[Letter by Vuk Draskovic, chairman of the Serbian Renewal Movement, SPO, to the foreign ministers of the Contact Group countries: "Support Serbia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic has increased the terror campaign against the democratic opposition, particularly after Dayton and Paris: He has banned the last independent electronic media, is preventing privatization of the economy, is forcefully nationalizing the existing private property, has increased the police system of repression, has mobilized the members of the democratic opposition for military exercises, and has forced thousands of people into his party.

He has abolished television coverage of parliament proceedings and banned the state television and press from reporting on the activities of the democratic opposition. He has ordered the Supreme Court to ban the only independent television station (Studio B), which actually could only be seen in Belgrade and the surrounding area, and committed a scandalous act by proclaiming the privately owned shares of Studio B state-owned.

The country is enveloped by an informational darkness. The citizens are served only the views of Milosevic's procommunist party and those of his wife's openly communist party. After Dayton and Paris, a marital system of authority has been introduced in Serbia. The army, the police, all the media, the banks, companies, the Mafia, everything is in the hands of Milosevic and his wife.

It is suggested to the citizens that in Dayton and Paris Milosevic was given support from the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, Germany, the EU, and NATO to do as he pleases in Serbia.

Expelled from the parliament and without access to the media, the democratic opposition (without the fascistic parties that Milosevic formed during the war) has started to organize mass rallies throughout Serbia, demanding Milosevic's departure and urgent and fundamental European reforms in Serbia.

We organized one such meeting on 9 March in Belgrade. Milosevic ordered the police to ban the rally, and when he heard about the tens of thousands of supporters of the democratic opposition, he banned the setting up of the podium and loud speakers. That a head of state should concern himself with this!

Following Milosevic's orders, state television shot scenes of the half empty city square three hours before the start of the rally and broadcast these tapes to the viewers that evening, completely ignoring the fact that tens of thousands of citizens were calling for Milosevic's resignation, they were calling for reconciliation and cooperation among the republics of the former Yugoslavia, for free media, privatization, cooperation with the EU, and Serbia's integration into the family of European and world democracies.

Such an organized state lie does not exist anywhere else in Europe today.

Milosevic's regime is the only one in Europe that rules by lies and naked force. However, this regime steps back when faced with force; for example, Milosevic recently banned the activities of the Soros Foundation, but he reconsidered and announced that it would be getting permission to operate as soon as he got a letter from Mr. Christopher.

I am glad that Mr. Christopher sent the letter, but I am not glad that the governments of the great democratic states do not show equal decisiveness when it comes to the defense of the independent media, to the unblocking of the state media, to the respect of the basic human rights of the citizens of Serbia and the political rights of the opposition, all of which are endangered by the one-party repression and dictatorship.

Of course, the struggle for democracy in Serbia cannot be fought by foreign governments. The democratic forces in Serbia have more supporters than Milosevic and his wife, but this minority rules exclusively thanks to the fact that all the media, police, and money are in its hands. Unblocked media and fair elections under international control would ensure over a two-thirds majority victory for the pro-European democratic forces in Serbia.

Speaking on 9 March I said that the democratic forces in Serbia should exert pressure on Milosevic every day from within while the democratic world should do the same from without. The citizens supported this strongly.

I hope, esteemed ministers, that you, too, believe that there can be no lasting peace and reconciliation on the territory of the former Yugoslavia without the victory of democratic and antiwar forces, primarily in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

I believe that the international community is wasting valuable time if it expects that lasting peace can be ensured by those who started the war and conducted it, and if it believes that dictators can turn into democrats. The Al Capones of the Balkans can never turn into Mahatma Ghandis.

In the name of the democratic Serbia, the one which is struggling in complete media darkness, which is lacking both money and equipment and is exposed to police repression, I ask your governments to support that Serbia.

With warmest regards and best wishes,

Vuk Draskovic, SPO chairman

Serbia: Draskovic Contact Group Letter 'Political Suicide'

AU2603192396 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 26 Mar 96 p 1

[Commentary by Stevan Zec: "Vuk Draskovic and Aleksa Zunic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Even if the analysts of local political events were clear that Vuk Draskovic, chairman of the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO], committed political suicide at about 1330 on 9 March at the Republic Square when he accused the people (particularly the citizens of Belgrade) of not responding to the rally, now even little children know that he has also rammed a cross into his political grave. His cross has six instead of four arms, and they stand for the foreign ministries of the United States, Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia; that is, all those who received Vuk Draskovic's letter.

The existence of the letter is common knowledge: It was sent on 14 March, therefore, immediately after—one assumes—he had a good look at the rally by three opposition parties in Belgrade (which went as it did), and contains the worst kind of gossip, lies, and libel against the president of the Republic of Serbia as the personification of authority.

Why does this represent a cross on Vuk Draskovic's political grave? From the point of the internal political scene, it is unlikely that Mr. Draskovic will find anyone apart from his wife and adviser (Danica Draskovic has been publicly calling for foreign military intervention for a long time in the paper she runs) who would justify his attempts at using foreign political or military power, therefore illegal means, to get into power in Serbia. Between the two Vuks (Brankovic and Draskovic) no open collaborator ever had mass support from the Serb people.

Viewed from the outside, Mr. Draskovic appears terribly naive to believe that he will endear himself to any foreign ministry or open the eyes of any foreign service by describing his opposition vision of the political developments here. The naivete of the SPO leader is all the greater since his hopes are in vain—no country will give open support of any kind (political, financial, subversive) at the demand of an opposition politician. It is not hard to imagine what the foreign ministers of the six great powers think about Draskovic after such letters. These letters tell more about him than about the people he mentions in them. By writing letters to foreign ministers of the great world powers, Draskovic is imitating Aleksa Zunic [fictional character from Serb literature], the police agent who had visiting cards printed with his profession put down in writing as regional spy.

If you remember, in Nusic's novel Zunic says that it has to do with the Serb mentality, claiming that while he was a secret agent no one wanted to tell him anything, but since he revealed his profession on his visiting card people were queuing up to inform on others. That is Mr. Draskovic's main mistake. International diplomacy, public and secret, does not happen at the level of the Serb village mentality at the end of the 19th century. International politics is slightly more subtle and complex.

Serbia: Press Assails Draskovic Over Anti-Milosevic Letter

AU2603155596 Paris AFP in English 1517 GMT 26 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 26 (AFP)—Opposition leader Vuk Draskovic was vilified by the official press here Tuesday, branded a traitor for calling on western powers to step up pressure on Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

In a letter earlier this month to the foreign ministers of Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the United States, the opposition writer accused the Belgrade authorities of dictatorship and using repression and torture against opponents.

"I think that the international community is wasting precious time if it is waiting for a durable peace (in the former Yugoslavia) to be installed by those who started and prosecuted the war, and if it thinks that dictators can transform themselves into democrates," the letter said.

The Draskovic letter also charged that the "army, police, media, banks, businesses, and the mafia are in the hands of Milosevic and his wife Mira Markovic."

The mass-circulation VECERNJE NOVOSTI called for charges to be brought against Draskovic, leader of the Serbian Renewal party.

"The public prosecutor should have immediately applied the constitution to protect the country against attacks from foreign powers openly called for by the leader of a political party," the paper said.

BORBA, the government daily, said the letter was another "nail in the coffin of his political ambitions," while the POLITIKA EKSPRES daily accused him of "political naivety."

Serbia: Counterfeit $100 Bills Circulate in Belgrade

AU2503204296 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 22 Mar 96 p 28

[Article by L.J.M.T.: "A Bagful of Fake Dollars"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] For several days already, Jugoslav Simic from Cacak has been sitting in Belgrade County Prison, accused of the dissemination of around $70,000 in counterfeit dollars. As VESTI has learned, counterfeit $100 bills were found in his possession. Over the past several days, these bills have been appearing in Belgrade shops, although in individual cases, so it is assumed that a larger quantity of fake U.S. dollars was smuggled into Yugoslavia.

According to an expert analysis done by the National Bank's experts, this is counterfeit money of poor quality, easily recognizable, among other things also because of the repetition of serial numbers.

According to sources close to the County Public Prosecutor's Office in Belgrade, Simic brought the fake dollars from a city in the Republic of Serb Krajina. [passage omitted]

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